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Preface
This thesis provides a survey of post-foundational philosophy and explains reader
response theory as one possible application of its insights within the field of literary theory. The
main premise which unites these two theories is that belief precedes inference. Before people
encounter any element of their world or any literary work, they harbor certain presuppositions
that influence how they perceive and interact with that subject. This thesis ultimately centers on
the question of whether a postmodern author who buys into these theories can presume to
influence readers or larger society. It asks whether people can overcome these prior beliefs in
order to significantly change their worldview, interact with opposed ideologies, and ultimately
alter society. Through a reader response analysis of Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 and
Inherent Vice, I argue that post-foundationalism allows writers to influence readers in a manner
that is neither specific nor direct but nonetheless valuable.
This project would not even exist as an idea without the efforts of my two co-advisors:
Dr. Lara Narcisi and Dr. Scott Dimovitz. I approached Dr. Narcisi with a vague interest in
postmodern philosophy, Thomas Pynchon, and his unique means of forcing readers into
conscious constructions of the text. She introduced me to reader response theory, provided me a
comprehensive introduction to the larger field of literary theory, and provided countless sessions
of brainstorming and support. Dr. Dimovitz guided me through the incredible genre of
postmodern literature while also forcing me to actually write the ideas then circulating in my
head or on scraps of notebook paper. Through individual meetings and numerous reviews of my
drafts, they both forced me to add a level of nuance and detail to my writing that I could not have
imagined before. So, a final thank you to these brilliant and genuinely good people. I hope I can
talk to you about Thomas Pynchon for years to come!

C hapter 1
I ntroduction
Throughout I nherent Vice, Thomas Pynchon offers a sort of comedic release through his
frequent use of deliberate and unintentional misinterpretations as when Doc warns, “You don’t
want to start smoking, Bigfoot, smokin’s bad for your ass” only for Bigfoot to respond, “Yes
well I wasn’t planning to smoke it in my ass, was I?” (270). Though not necessarily the most
high-brow of moments from Pynchon’s repertoire, this turn of dialogue from appropriate and
expected response actually seems to highlight a common human predicament. Such verbal
disharmony alludes to a main contention of post-foundational philosophy and its derivative of
reader response theory: belief precedes inference. In the case of post-foundational philosophy,
scholars note how belief in the rightful dominance of some form of authority typically precedes
and influences persons’ processes of reaching conclusions. In the case of reader response theory,
scholars note how readers’ assumptions and expectations are formed prior to the act of reading
by experience and environment which influence their processes of interpretation.
The original proponents of these theories--such as Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jacques
Derrida--presented these revelations as liberating. Recognition of these authorities could allow
for critique which might eventually free people from ideological constraints in embrace of a
proliferation of difference. Reader response theory might similarly promote difference by
liberating the individual reader from the interpretive restraints of authorial intent. However, more
recent critics such as Stanley Fish complicate this exuberant optimism by noting how contextdriven truth might actually result in people so embedded within their surrounding systems that
radical critique and change proves highly complicated. For Fish, the influence and profusion of
context appears so potent that people from different contextual backgrounds struggle to even
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effectively engage with one another which lessens the likelihood of change resulting from
newfound integration. Post-foundationalism and reader response theory seem to imply that
interactions between separate parties break down (often without the parties’ full knowledge) into
a disjointed series of misinterpretations akin to the absurdity of Doc’s and Bigfoot’s interaction.
The subtle though crucial rift within the philosophical movement of postmodernism
briefly mentioned before complicates any attempts to describe or unite such scholars under a
single label. While “anti-foundationalist” seems an adequate term for early postmodern scholars
such as Lyotard and Derrida, it seems problematic for scholars like Fish who still acknowledge
restraints upon human thoughts and actions. Scholars such as Stanley Fish and Frederic Jameson
have employed “anti-foundationalism” to refer to the works of Lyotard and Derrida because
these scholars rejected foundationalist epistemologies which ground truth in a core, essential
belief and hoped to demolish or challenge all such existing standards. While recent scholars like
Fish similarly challenge foundational premises and other forms of authority as the basis for
belief, they approach even their predecessors’ confident efforts to liberate persons from all such
thought with skepticism. In the case of Fish who rejects the possibility of people or society
entirely diagnosing and dismantling presuppositions, “post-foundationalism” helps distinguish
his works from the complete opposition entailed by the term “anti-foundationalism.”
Interestingly, the term “post-foundationalism” was first employed by the “postfoundationalist
theology” movement which recognized the challenges thrust upon Christianity by a postmodern
world-view and sought an alternative outside the binary of foundational versus anti-foundational
thought 1. Throughout this paper, the term serves two roles. In the context of discussions which
regard the range of postmodern philosophy dating from Lyotard and Derrida all the way to
Stanley Fish, “post-foundationalism” expresses the overall challenge raised against the

foundational past. In the context of discussions regarding Stanley Fish alone, it also contains this
prior meaning--or connotation--of a third option beyond the restraints and expectations of these
two competing philosophical groups. In an appropriately postmodern sense, this term could
never hope to escape such complexity and multiplicity of meaning.
For a more concrete example of how such post-foundational and reader response
approaches identify impediments to communication and change, one might turn towards many
episodes of the parody news program The Daily Show With Jon Stewart. During a recent episode
wherein he describes the points of contention surrounding the Supreme Court’s hearing on the
Affordable Care Act, Stewart notes a divide so divergent that it hardly seems like a debate or a
coherent discussion at all. Proponents of President Obama’s healthcare reform identify
themselves as advocates for quality and affordable healthcare for all members of society;
opponents of President Obama’s healthcare reform identify themselves as defenders of the
American constitution and freedom. He comments that “those do not seem like two halves of the
same argument” so that it feels as discordant as two sides proclaiming, “I’m team Jacob; I’m
anti-tyranny.” What Stewart describes as a disharmony amounts to a misunderstanding between
people from two opposed worldviews. The former side rests upon the assumption that healthcare
is a fundamental human right so that they envision the debate to center around prescriptive
arguments concerning the best possible means to provide wider coverage. The latter side rests
upon the assumption that governmental mandates (particularly concerning an issue as
monumental as personal health) necessarily violates individual freedom so that they envision the
debate to center around the right of government to involve itself in the economic choices of
citizens at all. Both sides thus not only base their reasonings on entirely different assumptions:
their divergent assumptions cause them to hold, or prioritize, entirely different values which
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seem as natural and obvious to them as the ground they stand upon. Both sides seem so
enveloped within the contexts that foster these assumptions that they cannot help but analyze the
opposing side’s messages through a distorting perspective. After all, how could any rational
person stand against sick persons acquiring the help they need? How could any rational person
oppose freedom? Because the assumptions prove so unbalanced, people from these opposing
sides struggle to engage in any kind of responsive or constructive discourse which prevents them
from combining their unique perspectives into a new policy or insight. The debate, the healthcare
system, the political system, and most literally the legislative halls thus seem doomed to state of
inaction and stasis.
A post-foundational reader response theory thus entails significant consequences for
authors seeking to ignite or foster some sort of change in readers or larger society. Authors have
traditionally written for a variety of reasons apart from attempts to so influence readers. The
“Manifesto of the World” famously expressed a Modernist disregard for readers as he declared,
“The plain reader be damned.” However, certain authors and literary critics have harbored some
hope and faith regarding the transformative power of words--particularly words in the form of
literature. If a contemporary author buys into post-foundational theories, which claim people are
too embedded within a context to allow any significant challenge towards their epistemological
foundations, as well as reader response theory, which claims readers necessarily construct a text
according to their own presuppositions, then must they forego this aspiration? Much like few
people continue to expect wealth from alchemy, must authors demote literature as a vehicle for
social change to the dustbins of failed aspirations?
My explorations of these postmodern themes and this conundrum of change consist of
three chapters which examine the works of prominent postmodern critics before applying their

insights to the literary works of Thomas Pynchon. The second chapter offers a survey of postfoundational attempts to identify and challenge the various forms of authority which have
traditionally served as the basis for past beliefs. This chapter illustrates the wide variety of such
efforts ranging from modernist opposition to overt power structures to Jean Francois Lyotard’s
rejection of ideological systems to Derrida’s deconstruction of language to Stanley Fish’s recent
campaign against principle. This chapter primarily explores the works of Fish who challenges the
grand intentions of his predecessor claiming people can never find a transcendent view from
which to critique all foundations. The third chapter provides a survey of reader response theory
which I present as an application of post-foundational philosophy within the disciple of literary
theory. Specifically, it challenges authorities which serve to ground or limit a text’s
interpretation: authorial intent and the text’s language itself. I explore the two ends of a spectrum
that instead recognize the less predictable presence of individual readers’ interpretation: the
works of Wolfgang Iser and Stanley Fish. I conclude the chapter by arguing that Iser’s moderate
theory, unlike Fish’s radical approach, fails to respond to many of the post-foundational
challenges raised against language and knowledge. The fourth chapter then offers a reader
response analysis of Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 and I nherent Vice. Such analysis
seeks to explore whether a post-foundational, reader response author can hope to identify and
challenge societal standards of truth as well as provide readers with a clear message in the hopes
of changing a social order.
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C hapter 2
Post-foundationalism: Defending Doubt as Opposed to C ertainty
Due to the emphasis post-foundationalism places upon difference, critics find it
challenging and awkward to condense the theory into one principle concept. However, postfoundationalism most broadly and simply refers to a rejection of authority in its multitude of
forms as the basis for belief. Consequently, an exercise of chief interest and importance for postfoundational theorists is the identification of these epistemological power structures--some of
which prove more obscure than others. One might reasonably identify the most explicit and thus
easily critiqued of such authorities as those entities or institutions which presume to embody or
somehow deliver truth. Such overt power structures have popularly taken the form of divine
beings such as God delivering his moral truths to Moses on stone tablets so as to illustrate their
universal and timeless resonance. For many, institutionalized faith serves as a simulacrum for
God’s presence and thus adopts a similar role as an undisputed medium for truth. For others, an
indubitable state or governmental leader adopts this role as the values and practices it prescribes
seem as natural and superior as any system established by any God.
However, postmodern critics arguably dedicate less energy towards analyzing such overt
ideological authorities, presumably since their modernist forefathers already identified and
critiqued them resolutely. Kevin J.H Dettmar’s and Jennifer Wicke’s “The Twentieth Century”
identifies some of the most significant events and critiques which weakened the influence of
various ideological apparatuses. They note advances made throughout the later nineteenth and
twentieth centuries in the natural and physical sciences 2 which challenged narratives of
organized religions (2114). They explain the momentous upset of World War I which lasted four
years rather than the expected couple of weeks (2116). The Great War resulted in hundreds of

thousands of British casualties and a cost of over nine million combatant lives overall so that
“notions of British invincibility, of honor, even of the viability of civilization weakened” (2116).
Peter Barry’s Beginning Theory: An I ntroduction to Literary and Cultural Theory similarly
describes the destabilizing influence of World War II. He claims the Holocaust upset for many
critics the notion of Germany--and the European state in general--as the nucleus of advanced and
proper social organization (64). This global conflict also increased the already considerable
animosity towards England amongst its colonial territories as the state drafted millions of
colonial subjects to augment its defenses. The world thus witnessed a surge of independence
movements immediately following the war so that an empire, which at one point controlled onefourth of the world, dramatically eroded (Dettmar and Wicke 2127). As new discoveries revealed
the flaws of past ideological institutions and even the most imposing centers of power were
reduced to fragments, many people began to doubt the ability for any all-encompassing
authority.
Jean-Francois Lyotard, a groundbreaker for the anti-foundational movement, envisions
and combats power in its slightly more opaque form as he focuses upon systems of thought
rather than single figures or institutions of power. His seminal essay from 1982, “Answering the
Question: What is Postmodernism?,” expresses this distinction as he encourages readers to reject
“would-be authoritative ‘overarching,’ ‘totalising’ explanations of things” (emphasis mine, qtd
by Barry 86). Integral to this understanding of authority as “systems of thought” is the notion of
presuppositions, those beliefs often implicitly assumed as necessarily true which allow
individuals to develop concomitant sequences of truths. Such assumptions have adopted a variety
of forms such as belief in the basic goodness of humanity, belief in the existence of a benevolent
and omnipotent divine creator, or even a belief as simple as the orderly and referential nature of
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language. Lyotard disregards such a priori assertions as fallacious but mainly criticizes the
systems of thought which post-foundationalists suspect to be their typical end products. Those
who faithfully subscribe to such presuppositions necessarily also subscribe to their logical
conclusions or extensions while at the same time instantly reject contradictory points as illogical.
For Lyotard, such syllogistic reasoning eventually leads to “totalizing” 3 thought in that it
produces “the idea of a unitary end of history and of a subject” (87). If individuals subscribe to a
presupposition and its subsequent system of truth wholeheartedly, then they assume its universal
application and simplify the world accordingly. Such a theory proves “overarching” or
“totalizing” (86) because it attempts to condense the enormity and complexity of the world and
all human nature within one single explanation. To render this concept more comprehensible and
less abstract, Lyotard provides “Christianity, Marxism, or the myth of scientific progress” (86) as
three prominent examples. Christianity, Marxism, and faith in science might initially seem like
entirely disparate world-views; however they relate through their common attempts to view the
world comprehensively and systematically.
Jacques Derrida appropriated this post-foundational distrust of power yet arguably
heightened its impact and scope by revealing language itself as an unreliable authority. Derrida
profited immensely from the works of structuralist linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure who
provided two momentous insights regarding language. First, structuralists believe language
constructs individuals’ perceptions of the world and thus--for all intents and purposes--the world
itself. Barry summarizes this point well as he explains language actively creates the world of
objects and experiences rather than simply “reflects” or “records” it for future posterity (59). An
objective, external world may exist; however, humans’ dependance upon their linguistic devices
to comprehend such a reality necessarily renders it a human construct. Second, structuralists

argue that this architectural language is arbitrary in that it “isn’t a reflection of the world and of
experience, but a system which stands quite separate from it” (40). Essentially, structuralists
established a sharp distinction between the “signifier” which refers to the word or symbol and
the referent which refers to the subject as it actually exists in reality. The signifier is not
necessarily connected to or originated from the referent but rather chosen by chance.
Identifying a randomly constructed and unstable language as the main determinant for
individuals’ worldview may seem disparaging or even unsound to some, but Derrida and his
fellow deconstructionists felt as though such a move constituted the only way to accept the full
implications of these structuralist insights. According to Barry, structuralists ultimately viewed
language as an “orderly” system which allowed them to assume individuals could still employ
words to attain stable meanings (62). On the contrary, Derrida views language as a “chaotic”
system. He claims the signifier is “constantly floating free” from the referent (62) and thus
language is constantly “floating free” from the speaker’s initial meanings/ intentions. Derrida
and fellow deconstructionists offer specific reasons for the inherent instability, or “slippage”
(62), of language. First, they deny the ability of any word to contain one unadulterated meaning
as they all are necessarily ‘“contaminated’ by their opposites” (64). This point originates from
the structuralist belief in the relational quality of words--the notion that a word’s meaning is
contingent upon its relation to other associated words (42) so that the signifier “teenager” only
acquires meaning through its subtle differentiations from the signifiers “child” and “adult.”
According to post-structuralists, a word proves even more contaminated when it is part of a
dyadic pair since people define the word mainly through its perceived opposition to its converse
partner. Many persons thus consider “femininity” to be any traits supposedly dissimilar to
“masculinity” while “good” only makes sense as contrary to “bad” and “falsity” is supposedly
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that which lacks “truth.” When a speaker employs a word, he or she thus inadvertently and
unavoidably recalls its associates or opposites, which severely complicates the intended transfer
of meaning. Deconstructionists diagnose etymology as a further contaminate of language as
multiple separate meanings from the past and present reside within a single word. Barry
playfully explains that seemingly dead usages of words retain a “ghostly presence within
present-day usage, and are likely to materialize just when we thought it was safe to use them”
(64). Employing the logic of this metaphor, this ghost of the word’s past meaning might adopt
the form of a connotation. This seems especially plausible in the case of poetic language which
often chooses or rejects specific words based on such subtle or buried intimations. Finally and
perhaps most critically, language necessarily involves omissions. No expression of language--no
matter how intricately crafted--can foresee and settle all questions or uncertainty and thus cannot
prevent ambiguity. Derrida thus ultimately rejects the possibility of any “pure performative,”
meaning any use of language which completely constrains interpretation and thus successfully
transfers the source’s intention without doubt or such ambiguity (Bennington 6). If individuals
necessarily create and conceptualize the world through language, then such linguistic uncertainty
precludes the possibility for any piece of stable meaning.
To this linguistic anxiety, many readers might ask, “But can’t you just ask for
clarification? Can’t you simply ask someone what he or she really means?” The assumption
underlying such a sentiment is one that Stanley Fish dedicates much effort to identity and
challenge: belief in the presence--absence dyad. Post-foundationalists and post-structuralists
often dedicate themselves to complicating, inverting, or overall demolishing the (in their
opinions fallacious) dichotomies erected in attempts to establish order. For Fish, the presence-absence dyad seems the most powerful and encompassing of dyads. By “absence,” Fish refers to

“a mode of knowing” which is “indirect, opaque, context-dependent, unconstrained, derivative,
and full of risk” (Naturally 41). Examples include “metaphorical language” (40) such as that
found in fiction or poetry. “Mediated” language also seems a powerful example such as
conversation held over distance so that parties cannot read one another’s non-verbal signals
which help establish tone. “Absence” might also occur during speech between strangers or
parties which, as of yet, know not what to expect from one another (38). By “presence,” Fish
refers to the converse of “a mode of knowing that is, at least relatively if not purely, direct,
transparent, without difficulties, unmediated, independently verifiable, unproblematic, pre
interpretive and sure” (41). Examples include “literal language” (40) as one might find in most
everyday conversation, a scientific journal, or a news article. As Stanley Fish readily admits, this
dyad seems to align with common sense and the evidence of people’s own experiences. Some
language is clearer, more direct, and more explicit than others. Are not Derrida and other poststructuralists merely lumping all forms of language together and carelessly pointing towards its
less direct uses to discredit the entire system? If a friend approached you to say, “Ineluctable
modality of the visible. At least that if no more, thought through my eyes. Signature of all things
I am here to read, seaspawn and seawrack. the nearing tide, that rusty boot,” (Joyce 37) then
could I not simply ask, “What do you mean? What do you mean to express by ‘seaspawn’ or
‘rusty?”’ Can the instability posited by post-structuralists be substantially curtailed simply by
switching from metaphorical to direct language?
Post-structuralists repudiate the presence-absence binary and thus this hopeful solution to
a realm of uncertainty. Barriers exist between all speech acts and the referents they hope to
transparently express, and no forms of communication are more privileged than others.
According to Fish, all speech is mediated by the beliefs and perspectives of the persons receiving
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the message; consequently, they can never feel fully confident that what they receive is in fact
the speaker’s full intention. Imagine that I am friends with Stephen Dedalus and he responds to
my question: “I mean that I cannot help but mainly experience my surroundings through the
sense of vision. 4” At first this explanation seems far more clear; however, the ultimate purpose
or “spirit” (Naturally 42) of his message would remain as ambiguous as before. Meaning is not
solely derived from words’ common definitions found within dictionaries but mainly rests upon
the speaker’s underlying intent. Does Stephen intend to bemoan, celebrate, or simply
acknowledge the dominant role of his sight? More importantly, does he intend to ignite an
epistemological discussion between intellectual equals or illustrate his intellectual superiority? If
I asked Stephen to elucidate these intentions, I might confidently accept his answer and
experience a relatively successful transfer of meaning. However, it seems just as likely that I
might distrust his response and remain uncertain due to prior feelings or preconceptions such as
personal insecurities, doubts concerning his character, ext. Many people assume that their beliefs
or understandings develop from others’ words or phrases; however, beliefs precede interpretive
efforts so that they actually determine the word’s meanings. Individual beliefs/ presuppositions
precede inference and meaning so that “communications of every kind are characterized by
exactly the same conditions--the necessity of interpretive work, the unavoidability of
perspective” (44). The result is what Eagleton refers to as the paradox of language: “the more
information a [speech act] provides, the more indeterminate it becomes” (66). Because language
is necessarily interpreted, more words seem to increase the amount of their recipient’s
interpretive work which increases rather than constrains the amount of misunderstanding.
Stanley Fish’s works seem immensely influenced both by Lyotard’s emphasis on larger
systems of thought and Derrida’s interest in the instability of language. However, his works

prove somewhat unique in that they focus upon broad concepts whose meanings are falsely
assumed as explicit, universal, and constant rather than contextually constructed. Fish alludes to
this focus most clearly as he claims to challenge “a vocabulary” which “stigmatizes
counterarguments (‘you mean you’re against fairness?’) even before they are heard” (Free
Speech 16). One may reasonably summarize Fish’s focus as the critical analysis of “principle,”
meaning the subtle, linguistic appeals to overarching standards or ethics. In The Trouble With
Principle, Fish explains that “Each of these maxims, urges us to enter a perspective wider than
that formed by our local affiliations and partisan goals; each gestures towards a morality more
capacious than the morality of our tribe, or association, or profession, or religion” (2).
According to Fish, individuals constantly employ terms such as “neutrality,” “merit,” “fairness,”
or “freedom” (16) as though they possess an inherent and indisputable meaning and thus an ideal
to which everyone should aspire. Fish’s careful description of these terms (or principles) as
standards which rest apart from “religion” (2) seems particularly interesting, for it emphasizes
how many individuals who reject overt power structures and even Lyotard’s more subtle
assumption-driven systems of belief (like religion) succumb to faith in these terms instead.
Principle has proven a highly powerful appeal because of its reputation as something apart from
all things idiosyncratic or contextual. Its stature seems further evident by peoples’ willingness to
even judge or critique their religious dictums and systems through appeals to such standards.
People often presume to reject a religious policy by claiming it violates some standard of justice,
love, or kindness because they assume these terms possess comprehensive meanings. Fish also
finds proof of their potency in their frequent use by both conservative and socially liberal
agendas such as those of radical free speech advocates and feminists (Free Speech 16).

14

Ultimately, such confidence in these terms’ meanings produce more subtle though
equally erroneous systems of thought. As Fish explains, these terms profess for many a “release
from ideological gridlock by providing a means of adjudication” (17). If such terms are certain
and thus “hostage to no ideology,” then society may objectively “test the coherence of any
ideology” (17) by erecting them as standards for judgment. It follows that through such
principle-based logic, policies “favoring no one and respecting everyone can be identified and
implemented” (3). However, faith that such terms possess universal and constant definitions (let
alone reveal certain policies or beliefs as superior) proves disqualified by the legitimate doubts
and debates constantly surrounding them. Like all else, these terms “will have different meanings
in relation to different assumptions and background conditions.” (4). Consequently, such terms
“do not mark out an area quarantined from the pull of contending partisan agendas; they are
among the prizes that are claimed” (4). As a result, much of Fish’s work seems dedicated to
pulling these individual terms apart in order to reveal their internal contradictions.
Because even Stanley Fish admits that his works mostly “reduce” to this basic argument,
one might best illustrate his contribution to post-foundational thought by detailing his
deconstruction of a specific principle: fairness. Individuals often appeal towards the notion of
fairness (mainly from a stance of indignation) without consciously and critically examining their
understanding of this broad term. However, this term cannot possess or express any semblance of
meaning unless the speaker has “specified the background conditions in relation to which
fairness has an operational sense” (Principle 3). The meaning of fairness is contingent upon a
person’s unique contextual environment because fairness is merely a judgement regarding an
action’s accordance with previously held expectations or interests (Free Speech 3). People
navigate their social worlds with a set of assumptions regarding what will, should, or must

happen along the course of their ways. If some event or another person’s actions violate these
expectations, then they deem such occurrences “unfair.” However, Fish skillfully notes how
different environments and experiences instill people with drastically different expectations
which lead to drastically different determinations of fair.
For example, he explains how recent equations between affirmative action and the racism
for which it attempts to compensate result from such varied definitions. One side of the debate
views fairness as a process whereby institutions base significant selections (such as college
admittance) exclusively upon merit as determined by seemingly neutral and verifiable criteria
like grade point averages or test scores. Fairness requires that such institutions do not take
anything outside the control of the individual student into account such as race or a history of
oppression (60). This standard seems obvious to many; thus, the conclusion that black and white
students’ applications receive the same treatment seems equally straightforward. However, this
standard hardly proves the neutral guarantee against a privileging of one group over another that
its advocates so imagine. A black student might counter by listing past efforts “to deprive [black]
citizens of their voting rights, to limit access to an educational institution, to prevent entry into
the economy except at the lowest and most menial levels” (Naturally 610) and countless other
forms of stigmatization which have all combined to lessen his or her chance of acceptance at a
desired university. Due to their experiences with these impediments, such students’ definitions of
fairness might likely include some means of accounting for a past which uniquely disadvantaged
certain groups. To reach agreement, these students from different background conditions would
thus find themselves forced to identify and argue the merit of each others’ background
conditions. Of course, the argument would likely fall upon even more maxims of principle so
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that efforts to reach an entirely neutral--or inclusive--conclusion would prove complicated at
best.
A common implication of such a post-foundational dismissal of authority--as previously
alluded towards--is an emphasis upon (or recognition of) multiplicities of understanding and thus
difference or contradiction. Foundationalists’ belief in some overarching authority as the
standard for truth encourages them to define “truth” as some premise with credence that extends
beyond contextual, temporal, or personal circumstances. Essentially, truth is that which proves
itself as universal. Consequently, those who fail or choose not to comply with such truths are
stigmatized if not persecuted as immoral or insane. For post-foundationalists, individual context
supplants transcendent authority as the source of truth which encourages them to view “truth” as
a relative and disparate term. Stanley Fish speaks for most post-foundationalists as he contends
that all aspects of life “will have different meanings in relation to different assumptions and
background conditions” (4). Fish attempts to more clearly define these types of influential
background conditions as he notes the importance of one’s “political affiliation, educational
experience, ethnic tradition, gender, class, institutional experience, etc.” (4). Fish’s use of “etc.”
proves especially appropriate, for the contingencies upon which an individual’s perspective are
based seem nearly endless. One might add religious affiliation to this list along with one’s access
to recreational drugs or even a significant neighbor across the street from one’s childhood home.
Post-foundationalists thus view the assumption that all individuals or societies could find
unanimous agreement regarding any subject with fierce skepticism. Fish for one does not reject
objective, universal truth as a theoretical concept but rather denies the potential of any humans to
discover or recognize such a force due to the inherent limitations of any one person’s or group’s
experience and perspective. Fish’s There’ s No Such Thing As F ree Speech (And I t’ s a Good

Thing Too) dedicates significant effort to challenging politicians, educators, artists and others
who profess to promote “common” values or overall “unity” by curtailing the “political” by
which they refer to the fringe interests of a particular group. Fish explains that “While there are
such truths, they could only be known from a god’s-eye view. Since none of us occupies that
view (because none of us is a god), the truths any of us find compelling will always be partial,
which is to say they will be political” (8). No person or larger group possesses an omniscient
perspective so that all world-views are limited and thus appear fringe to some separate person or
group.
Of course, the astute reader will note how modernism also refuted the tendency of past
philosophical traditions to develop comprehensive systems of thought from basic, core
principles. Yeats offered the epiphany that “things fall apart; the center cannot hold” while Eliot
mourned the “stony rubbish” to which roots cannot crutch--both of which seem like postfoundational sentiments. Various literary critics identify such modernist themes as evidence of
the basic continuity between modernism and post-modernism; however, this shared theme
actually highlights a critical distinction between the two movements. Modernism dismantled past
traditions’ ideological systems but anticipated and hoped desperately to replace them with a
foundational truth undiscovered as of yet. On the contrary, postmodern anti-foundationalism
disdains or distrusts all potential central premises of truth and the systematized thought they
produce. Terry Eagleton summarizes this distinction well as he states, “postmodernity means the
end of modernity, in the sense of those grand narratives of truth, reason, science, progress, and
universal emancipation which are taken to characterize modern thought from the Enlightenment
onwards” (200). For many, the natural corollary of this rejection of foundationalism as
oppressive is the promotion of anti-foundationalism as necessarily liberating. When one speaks
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of anti-foundationalim, he or she thus often recalls a tone of exhilaration or at least acceptance.
Anti-foundational critics seem particularly fond of employing political tyrants or physical
barriers as metaphors for past foundational thought. Recall, for example, Lyotard’s description of
foundational theory as “would-be authoritative” in his 1982 essay. Stanley Fish for one explicitly
links foundational thinking with past and present discrimination against minority communities.
He states in response to those like Lynne Cheney who fear that universal values and perspectives
are curtailed by the addition of post-colonial works to core curriculum, “Our children...do not
begin with shared perspectives; they are to be brought to the perspectives common to some of us
by a process in which the perspectives they may have shared, had in common, with others of us,
are either expunged or marginalized” (Free Speech 34). Eagleton expresses this sense of past
restriction and current liberation as he mimics or parodies various postmodern prose: “these fond
hopes have not only been historically discredited; they were dangerous illusions from the outset,
bundling the rich contingencies of history into a conceptual straightjacket.”
Many individuals who might likewise find themselves persuaded and exhilarated by postfoundationalism as an abstract concept often reject it on the basis of anecdotal objections. They
ask themselves (quite reasonably), “how can I subscribe to a theory which seemingly equates
Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice with Seth Grahame-Smith’s Pride and Prejudice and
Zombies?” More importantly, they question the validity of a theory which seems to rank
women’s equal opportunity movements on the same ethical level as bride burning. If contextual
chance proves the source of a society’s values and practices rather than an objective or
benevolent source like science or God, then any belief seems as unrooted in truth as the next and
thus as equally viable (or unviable) as the next. Past foundationalists have also framed the ethical
dilemma as one between “civilization and order versus the anarchy of the individual will” (Fish,

Naturally 11). Many persons thus assume they must forego all opinions or cease all social
activism once they enter a postmodern frame of mind.
However, Fish claims that the contextual nature of truth actually demands rather than
prohibits judgment and prohibits rather than demands the so-called “anarchy of the individual”
(11). A transcendental truth--by definition--must reside in some place or standard which stands
apart from the individual, the local, and in some cases even the earthly. However, its privileged
position apart from or beyond peoples’ surrounding contexts increases the likelihood that they
will overlook, misunderstand, or even ignore such a truth. If, for example, individuals depend
upon a distant and otherworldly God to deliver notions of truth, then they in most likelihood will
fail to receive the message. Even if an individual could receive this otherworldly truth, he or she
could escape these standards in theory by simply refusing--by saying “no” to this divine figure
and his law. Like Ivan of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers K aramazov, one might protest “I
hasten to give back my entrance ticket” even if he or she one day clearly understood God’s
ultimate plan and edicts. Instead, principles of truth and standards of judgment pervade every
facet of peoples’ surroundings from their families, schools, and favorite television sitcoms to the
structures of their language itself. Thus, these principles become implanted within and integral to
the individual. Stanley Fish actually titles one of his most prominent works Doing What Comes
Naturally to describe the “unreflective actions that follow from being embedded in a context of
practice” (IX). He explains that if notions of truth and thus appropriate behavior are created by
one’s surroundings, then “what you think to do will not be calculated in relation to a higher law
or an overarching theory but will issue from you as naturally as breathing” (IX). Just as people
can neither choose to breathe nor choose to not breathe, they can neither choose the principles
which govern their perspectives and daily behaviors nor reject the most omnipresent of underling
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principles which govern their communities. In order to develop a revolutionary and genuinely
subversive perspective or lifestyle, one must view and critique his or her current perspectives and
their sources from a separate vantage point. If these present perspectives and their sources are
independent and distinct from a person’s immediate context, then he or she could challenge them
from such an impartial/ objective frame of mind. If these sources are instead ubiquitous so that
they surround and form us from the moment of consciousness, then people can never attain for
even a moment the distance needed to launch such a monumental attack. When opponents warn
against the complete chaos and insurrection which result from the postmodern reign of unfettered
individual wills, Fish merely responds, “But how could such a personal preference even form
apart from some conventional system of thought or mores in relation to which it was possible
and thinkable?” since “anything that could be experienced as a preference will derive from the
norms inherent in some community” (11). Post-foundational critics thus often emphasize a sharp
distinction between themselves and anti-foundationalists, or “nihilists” as they are often
pejoratively labeled.
Fish only seems to identify one distinct impact of note between a foundational and postfoundational conception of truth. Principles of truth are products of their historical and societal
context; societal and historical contexts are not the products of some inherent principle of truth.
Thus, many principles assumed as absolute and constant are actually contingent and thus
challengeable. Post-foundationalist theory, according to Stanley Fish, thus allows for judgments
though they are judgments which demand rather than terminate debate: “Nor am I denying the
possibility of judgment...but merely observing that any judgment one might make in that
direction is disputable, and disputable by persons no less well educated than you or I” (Free
Speech 35). In fact, Stanley Fish himself frequently and unabashedly refers to his own points as

“right” though he prefaces these judgements not only with detailed and carefully developed logic
but also with explanations of the circumstances and background conditions which lead him to
accept such logic. While others purposefully hide or fail to consider the social origins of their
beliefs, he emphasizes them as he claims, “My sense of the rightness of my arguments is no less
strong...and is in no way diminished by my ability to give an account of its source” (Naturally 3).
This unique view which defends the legitimacy of one’s own views while simultaneously
opening them up to challenge is well summarized as Fish reasons, “On the one hand, the
condition of being without constraints is quite literally unimaginable and therefore need not be
feared; but on the other, the constraints that are always in place are not fixed but interpretive-forever being altered by the actions they make possible--and there is no danger that they will
forever hold us in the same position” (27). Fish perhaps explains this seeming paradox best when
he claims that “all preferences are principled” and “all principles are preferences” (11). Any
individual person’s belief or desire must derive from and function within the context (or
community) from which he or she was formed. However, every principle is an “extension of a
particular and contestable articulation of the world” (11) so that each community’s beliefs or
desires are not objectively verifiable or universally true but rather constructed and thus entirely
debatable.
Critics holding viewpoints and agendas associated with leftist politics also raise
objections against the perceived ramifications of post-foundational philosophy. Terry Eagleton, a
critic with Marxist inclinations, fears that postmodern philosophy, if carried to its logical
conclusions, often results in strict defense of the status quo. He specifically condemns what he
refers to as “conservative” schools of postmodern thought including “American neo-pragmatists
like Rorty and Fish” for whom “the collapse of transcendental viewpoints signals, in effect, the
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collapse of the possibility of full-blooded political critique” (203). The argument follows that if
objective truths separate from an individual’s time, place, or experience do not exist, then
individuals cannot find any autonomous place upon which to stand outside from their context as
an impartial judge. Therefore, post-foundationalists commonly perceived as radicals might
actually prove more reactionary than the staunchest of political conservatives. In a sense,
Eagleton’s critique proves well-founded and in fact finds support from Fish’s logic and the
language of his prose. Thus, a primary conflict within such versions of post-foundational
philosophy is whether it can provide the sort of ideological freedom and differentiation promoted
by previous scholars such as Lyotard and Derrida.

C hapter 3
R eader R esponse T heory: E xposing I nterpretation as Opposed to M eaning
Former Republican Presidential candidate Michelle Bachman demonstrated a fairly
typical mindset among the foundationalist, Christian community in a 2003 interview regarding
birth control education in public schools. The debate seems a resolvable one for Bachman as she
explains, “the Bible presents a standard to which everyone can repair, whether you are a believer
or not” as opposed to “this new [postmodern] way of thinking [which] offers no standard.”
However, her appeal to the Bible during a recent primary debate reveals the complications which
surround efforts to so elevate texts as a foundation or standard. Prior to this debate, Bachman
noted that her choice to pursue tax law actually ran counter to her own desires. She chose to
pursue tax law at her husband’s recommendation because the Bible explicitly informs women to
be subservient towards their husbands. When asked whether she would remain submissive
towards her husband as president of the United States, Bachman shrewdly replied, “Both he and
I--what submission means to us--if that’s what your question is--it means respect. I respect my
husband.” The single word “submission” thus seems to embody multiple different
connotations—or even meanings—for various readers so that one must adopt a highly active and
unique interpretive role even when reading what seems the most straightforward or sacred of
texts. Bachman’s example reveals that texts and the language from which they are formed are
uncertain and contingent whether one chooses to acknowledge that instability or not. Bachman’s
example thus illustrates how the uncertainty and contingency revealed by post-foundational
philosophy entails significant implications for many peoples’ primary means of accessing
information: the process of reading.
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Barry argues that postmodernists express the post-foundational repudiation of
fundamental principles by discarding those components of various practices once considered
essential. For example, he notes that “melody and harmony were put aside in music; perspective
and direct pictorial representation were abandoned in painting” (81). Various schools of critics
(most prominently New Historicists and Formalists) considered inherent, objective meaning
equally essential to literary works as harmony to music; thus, reader response criticism amounts
to as revolutionary a movement as abstraction for painting. Like post-foundational philosophy,
the term “reader response theory” encompasses a multitude of varied interpretations; however,
their common factor is an interest in the individual reader’s unique role in the construction of a
text’s meaning. In general, reader response critics argue that texts inherently possess
indeterminacies which require individual readers to produce what Terry Eagleton refers to as
“inferences” (65). No matter how direct, detailed, transparent, or overall intricately constructed a
text seems, its dependence upon language renders the message inherently indirect and influenced
by the context of an individual reader.
Literary critics have identified many such textual indeterminacies which often correspond
to the uncertainties posited by post-foundationalism against knowledge in general. Most broadly,
reader response theory relates directly to the post-foundational distrust of authority. While postfoundational philosophy rejects authority as the basis for any system or tenet of belief, reader
response theory rejects authority as the basis for a text’s meaning. Literary critics have typically
attempted to found a text’s authoritative meaning in one of two sources: the author or the
language of the text itself. The author seemed the favorite standard of meaning for the Romantic
and Victorian periods while New Critics of the early twentieth century promoted the texts’s
language as most crucial (64). The emphasis placed upon close reading in contemporary

university settings reveals the lasting influence of this latter approach. Both sources seem to offer
the text a comparative sense of stability as meaning is fixed in the single root of either an
individual author or a language which reveals a sole, underlying intent through laborious and
structured analysis. Through appeals to either of these sources, one may hold faith in the text as a
unified or holistic entity which any and all readers might discover in unanimous agreement. A
text becomes the transmitter or “standard” of meaning imagined and desired by Michelle
Bachman and fellow foundationalists. However, reader response critics view such standards as
implausible at their best and intellectually oppressive at their worst.
As previously mentioned, post-foundationalists reject figures or institutions which
explicitly presume to supply truth such as a king or a divine figure. In similar manner, reader
response critics reject authorial intent as the basis for a text’s meaning. Roland Barthes’s 1967
essay “The Death of the Author” expresses this connection well as he laments, “The image of
literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centered on the author, his person, his
life, his tastes, his passions;” specifically, “the explanation of a work is always sought in the man
or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through the more or less transparent
allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the author ‘confiding’ in us” (1). The author
thus adopts the role of a god figure in the sense that he/she “produces” or creates reality which
he/she then reveals to the chosen few who are willing and able to understand. The author seems
merely another figure or institution before which persons grovel or defer towards for meaning.
To recognize the severe (if not insurmountable) obstacles preventing readers from so
discovering authorial intent, one need only recall the challenges which underlie any attempts to
explain human behavior. If one recalls a writing exercise of his or her own--an essay, journal,
creative piece, etc.--then he or she would most likely recall the difficulty of ascertaining (let
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alone delivering) his or her full and clear meaning or intent. During any one moment of writing a
single person can contain multiple intentions. Some of these intentions might contradict; some of
these intentions might even remain hidden or unbeknownst to the author himself or herself. As
Eagleton notes, authorial intent rests upon the assumption that writers “are always in full
possession of their own meanings” (41)--an assumption which runs contrary to common
experience.
Of course, this dilemma proves only more complicated as readers with personal biases
and presuppositions attempt to objectively discern the internal intentions of a separate person.
Recall Fish’s argument against the presence--absence dyad which claims that assumptions and
interpretation always precede reasoning and conclusions. For Fish, the same premise applies to
readers’ attempts to “understand” or “know” an author and his or her intent. Fish quotes Derrida
who once defined writing as a form of language in which “the mark can do without the referent”
(Naturally 46) which he interprets to mean that writing can--and indeed must--be understood by
persons with no “independent” or transparent access either to the author or the initial, intended
audience. Readers can never know an author “independently” or--in other words--impartially.
Knowledge of an author and his/her intended meaning is preceded by, influenced by, and
dependent upon the reader’s previous assumptions regarding the author as a person and even
authorship as a profession. The author as he/she actually exists in reality 5 essentially disappears
“even in the original moment of [a work’s] production” (46) because he/she is thereafter “never
transparently present but must be interpreted or ‘read’ into being” (47). Barthes seems to offer a
similar argument when he states that from the moment language is recorded and thus extends
beyond its immediate context, “the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death,

writing occurs” (1). Because interpretation precedes understanding, the true author is never
understood but constructed by each individual reader.
Readers can, and most likely will, continue to appeal to authorial intent as they promote
certain interpretations of texts. However, such appeals seem mere rhetorical ploys since the
author and his/her intent exists more as construct of the reader’s mind than a concrete,
autonomous person. Fish further illustrates this notion with an intriguing mental exercise, asking
readers to imagine themselves as they attempt to uncover meaning from a written message
delivered without any signature. The reader of this anonymous message would of course first
enumerate a list of its potential writers. The reader would associate each of these separate writers
with separate purposes for writing the letter; thus, the range of this one letter’s meanings would
seem exasperatingly expansive. Fish then encourages readers to imagine they acquire more
information which reveals the author’s identity so that ostensibly “the indeterminacy...would
have been lessened and perhaps eliminated entirely” (Naturally 41). In actuality, Fish claims
such uncertainty would hardly be lessened at all by the mere name of the author since “what I
would want to know are his intentions, his purposes, his reasons” (42). Recall again Fish’s
previous argument against the presence--absence dyad which claims that meaning resides not in
the surface meanings of words but in the underlying “spirit” through which they are spoken.
Imagine once more that as you pass a man walking whom you consider rude or pretentious, he
calls out “Good morning.” You might think to yourself, “What a jerk. What’s his problem?,”
though his words alone never implied such hostility. Since the reader interprets the writer’s
identity based on prior understandings or assumptions before he/she even encounters or analyzes
the text, this underlying intent is necessarily mediated. Even if critics could presume to
objectively navigate the complexities of the author’s psyche at the precise moment of his/her
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writing, they would likely still need to choose which of the multiple intentions to foreground or
even which of the contradictory intentions to exclude altogether. The reader cannot escape his or
her interpretive influence when considering the author so that the text seems more of his or her
own creation.
If authorial intent fails and collapses as the source for a text’s clear and universal
meaning, then the language of the document itself might stand as a refuge. Language seems a
promising alternative since the words are facts concretely present on the pages no matter who
views or holds them. However, reader response critics appropriate much of the poststructuralists’ linguistic suspicions so that the text instead seems a series of holes and ambiguities
filled or solved by the reader. Eagleton explains that the reader often unconsciously makes
“connections, fills in gaps, draws inferences and tests out hunches” all of which force him or her
to draw on “tacit knowledge of the world in general and of literary conventions in particular”
(66). Readers determine how individual words, sentences, and passages relate to one another and
then create larger explanations to unite those connections. One might appeal to the opening
passage of Bachman’s preferred text—The Bible—to further demonstrate this point. The Book
of Genesis begins the story of creation by describing the earth as “formless and empty” before
claiming, “God said, ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light.” Most readers will assume
connections between these clauses and sentences; they will assume a chronological order
between the events they describe. Many readers might further assume that the text implies
immediacy or a very short timespan between these events. The clauses follow so quickly one
after the other that it seems God demanded light and light existed where moments before there
was only a “formless and empty” void. Upon further analysis, the text might not demand such a
connection between phrases and sentences at all, but rather might prove the product of present

literary conventions. Scientific discoveries which suggest the Earth formed on a non-human,
geologic timescale suggests readers may in fact connect these opening words in a variety of
contradictory ways.
Eagleton’s notion of “connections” and “gaps” (66) also correlates to Lyotard’s and
Fish’s analyses of presuppositions. No text—regardless of how scrupulously constructed by an
author—can explicitly inform readers of how each word is meant to be understood, let alone how
each words is meant to be understood in relation to other words. For example, confusion often
occurs as readers attempt to distinguish between a narrative and a free indirect voice. Readers
must constantly ask, is the sentence which follows expressed by (and therefore expressive of) the
same person? Essentially, readers possess presuppositions of how reality, literature, and even
language itself functions based upon their individual and social experiences or contexts.
Fish’s “How to Recognize a Poem When You See One” claims that readers must begin
the process of interpreting a piece of literature with the largest assumption of all: labeling the
work as a piece of literature. Specifically, he explains that “the act of recognition” precedes any
identification of the work’s distinguishing features or the formulation of overall meaning (232).
Once a reader presumes that the work before him or her is literary, he or she begins to analyze
that work in a literary manner. The reader assumes that the words possess potent meanings for a
larger community beyond the writer or an immediate audience, and he or she assumes
meaningful connections between these words. As an example, Fish recalls an experiment
wherein he wrote five random philosophers’ names in vertical order upon a blackboard for a
medieval religious poetry course. Once he told his class that the random assortment was a
medieval religious poem, they were able to analyze it in a literary manner by ascribing larger
religious meanings to words and their phonemes as well as by identifying suggestive connections
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between these words. Fish claims readers must precede all literary interpretations with the same
assumption regarding the text’s literary potential.
For such various reasons, reader response critics argue that the reader is an active force
rather than a merely passive vessel which receives meaning; thus, the reader’s experiences and
interpretive efforts become crucial for critics to acknowledge and study. All reader response
critics agree that the reader is essential; however, they disagree as to the extent to which the
author or text limits or constrains readers’ possible—or acceptable—interpretations. One may
thus view reader response theory as a spectrum. The Constace School of reader response theory-most prominently represented by Wolfgang Iser--rests on the moderate end of the spectrum with
its notion of “concretization” (Eagleton 67). According to this theory, meaning is less a stable
force fixed in either the text or the reader but rather something which is created through the
interactions of both parties (Fish, Naturally 69). According to Iser, both parties adopt crucial and
distinct roles which together construct meaning. The text provides a set of instructions or “cues”
which objectively and concretely exist for all readers despite their previous experiences and
contexts. Most obviously, the text provides words on a page which are material “facts” or “data”
(Eagleton 75). All literary critics can agree when a passage contains certain rhetorical devices
such as caesuras, alliteration, or even seemingly opaque devices such as metaphor. Regardless of
their deeper meanings, these devices possess a presence. However, Iser proves careful to clarify
that these instructions are hardly “explicit in an exhaustive way” (69) since the text also contains
“gaps” or “indeterminacies” in between (qtd by Fish 70). The text is much like a piece of matter
which seems solid and unified yet--upon closer examination--is actually compiled of countless
atoms each with gaps between their bonds. A piece of writing might seem a tightly constructed
and harmonious unit, but crucial gaps exist between the comparatively solid and clear “cues.”

Examples of such gaps include breaks between words, sentences, passages, and chapters which
the readers must connect. Indeterminacies also refer to each of the other previously detailed
ambiguities of language such as words with multiple meanings or connotations and general
omissions. Such a qualification prevents Iser from promoting literary works as objective and
complete which would reduce a reader to a purely submissive standing akin to a child dutifully
adhering to a paint-by-number kit. Readers follow the text’s instructions yet also fill these gaps
according to their unique perspectives or positions in a process referred to as “concretization.”
The text thus provides a basic structure or skeleton similarly present for all persons; the reader
then fills or completes this structure according to his or her own experience. The text therefore
contains or allows for multiple positions and interpretations set “alongside one another” which
the reader must choose from and organize.
According to Iser and his proponents, such a theory which affords different aspects of
meaning to different parties renders any work an occurrence or a process rather than a concrete,
stable artifact. Shakespeare’s Hamlet is not a single text but rather the continually evolving
compilation of all the experiences developed between its words and its innumerable readers. Iser
expresses this point himself as he explains, “the meaning of a literary text is not a definable
entity but a dynamic happening” (qtd by Fish 71). Iser even describes the general dynamics of
this “dynamic” process through his notion of “defamiliarization” (Eagleton 68). According to
Iser’s The Act of Reading, this process begins with readers’ “social and literary codes” (Eagleton
68) which are formed by individual experiences and contexts and which exist prior to any
engagement with texts. As previously stated, these codes allow a reader to so concretize the text
and derive any sense of meaning. However, the “facts” or “cues” of a literary work also possess
the potential to deliver the reader “a new critical awareness of his or her customary codes and
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expectations” (68) so as to “interrogate and transform” these presuppositions which he or she
often unconsciously place upon the text. Literature thus provides more than simply a mimetic
“mirroring” (Fish, Naturally 73) of the reader or the society which formed his or her perspective.
In fact, literary works’ fictive and creative qualities uniquely allow them to “achieve a distance”
(73) from these norms which forces readers to question common depictions which typically
naturalize these standards. Literary works remove these codes from their “functional” (73)
context--the context designed in such a way that the norm seems not only practical and useful but
perhaps even essential. For example, the reader might begin the process of interpreting Thomas
Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 with the social and literary expectation that investigators can
solve any mystery with enough attention to detail, proper analytical methods, and overall
perseverance because s/he has absorbed an abundance of Dateline specials and Sherlock Holmes
novels. However, Pynchon’s text deviates from this norm as the main protagonist and the readers
arguably struggle with more uncertainty by its end than at its outset. Thus, Pynchon deviates
from this norm’s previous position of legitimacy. Of course, such deviations produce an altered
set of norms which readers now employ to reconsider the text which--of course--now holds the
potential to deviate from a whole different set of norms so that a literary work is full of kinetic
energy capable of igniting a continuing process of change.
Iser’s theory thus adopts aspects of both foundational and post-foundational philosophy
as meaning is neither universally concrete nor entirely contingent upon individual readers. Fish
further suggests that Iser’s theory adopts a middle ground as it “avoids identifying the aesthetic
object either with the text, in its formal and objective self-sufficiency, or with the idiosyncratic
experience of individual readers” (Fish, Naturally 69). The relationship between the reader and
the text is viewed as “interactive” (69) and mutual which allows for the basic structure of

certainty found in the text while also allowing for the multiplicity of meanings found in readers.
The text is neither an objectively understood and unified piece of language nor the subjective
construct of an individual reader. Iser’s theory entails individual interpretation though an
interpretation with limits. Fish offers the imagery of celestial constellations to help explain this
abstract concept as he states, “the stars in a literary text are fixed; the lines that join them are
variable” (75). The individual facts of the text prove present and measurable such as the location
of stars in a sky; however, gaps between these stars place the burden upon readers to construct
patterns and propose meaningful forms. Most importantly, different people can connect these
stars in a multitude of ways so as to produce unique, final images. Interestingly, multiple pieces
of postmodern literature and criticism employs constellation imagery to describe reader response
theory such as Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49. After watching a production of a Jacobean play,
Oedipa Mass asks the director--named Driblette--for a copy of the script to which he responds,
“You guys, you’re like Puritans are about the Bible. So hung up with words, words” (79).
Driblette explains that the play actually resides in his own head, for “That’s what I’m for. To
give the spirit flesh 6...I’m the projector at the planetarium” (79). The reader thus possesses the
red laser pen which connects the scattered dots into Orion.
Some reader response theorists instead develop these reader-response observations to
their most extreme conclusion which is that there exists not even a basic structure which readers
may objectively agree upon; instead, a text is only the wide assemblage of divergent
interpretations. Fish claims that readers cannot help but interpret every word of literature through
what Iser refer to as their personal and social lenses or “codes”; thus, the text is less a stable
artifact or “process” than one constructed in countless, contradictory ways (Naturally 66).
Stanley Fish is arguably the most prominent—and thus the most controversial—of such critics
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who claim that “the true writer is the reader” (74). Rather than receive objective facts or “cues”
from a text, readers actually provide and construct so much information and meaning that they
ultimately prove its true authors. Fish acknowledges the appeal of such a middle-road theory as
Iser’s yet ultimately claims, “in the end it falls apart, and it falls apart because the distinction on
which it finally depends--the distinction between the determinate and the indeterminate--will not
hold” (74). One might detect an allusion to William Butler Yeats’s formative modernist poem
“The Second Coming” throughout this passage. Fish seems to imply that Iser and other middleroad reader response critics rest their arguments upon a foundational premise that will prove as
untenable as those dismantled in the past: the familiar presence--absence dichotomy.
Iser’s version of reader response theory depends upon a distinction between clear and
opaque language and thus arguably fails to contend with the full extent of post-foundational,
post-structuralist views of knowledge and language. Without the distinction between direct and
indirect language, Iser could not claim that certain pieces of the text concretely exist to limit or
guide readers’ interpretations (74). One could easily translate Iser’s notion of facts or textual
“cues” to mean “presence” (41) or “literal” (40) language while “indeterminacies” seem to refer
to “absence” (41) or “metaphorical” (40) language. Essentially, Iser implicitly appeals to the
assumption that some pieces of language exist beyond or prior to interpretation. Of course, postfoundationalists such as Fish cannot accept such an assumption as a firm theoretical basis.
Instead, one might object that the post-structuralist emphasis upon the adulteration and overall
slippage of words suggests no linguistic safe haven exists. Every delivered word holds the
potential--arguably even the likelihood--for misinterpretation through its relation to associated or
opposite terms, its past meanings, or its unforeseeable omissions. A single author cannot
determine and control where such ambiguity lies nor how a widely diverse readership might fill

in/ guide such ambiguity; imagine now the difficulty of a reader attempting to determine where
an author determined such ambiguity.
Furthermore, post-foundationalism challenges Iser’s presence 7 of textual codes by
explaining them as constructs available only to people informed by the same formative contexts.
According to Fish, such codes only exist as a result of “interpretive strategies” formed by
communities of readers. Many such interpretive communities exist including the communities of
gender, race, nationality, social class, and profession. Notably, Fish’s concept of interpretive
communities seems the exact same as his notion of “background conditions 8” (4) which precede
meaning and necessitate difference. For Fish, interpretive communities structure every facet of
one’s perception which includes his or her understanding of the external, “real” world in addition
to a literary work. Additionally, people’s perspectives are formed by more than one interpretive
community at any given time. Any single person is formed by a complex medley of interpretive
communities simultaneously imposing their unique interpretive strategies 9. In the case of
reading, Fish identifies one community as particularly dominant and perhaps even inescapable
for those sufficiently versed within its confines: post-secondary or higher education (Eagleton
75). According to this view, rhetorical strategies such as caesura only exist insofar as a network
of literary academics claim they exist, train readers to detect them, and finally inform readers as
to their underlying intent or effect. A caesura is present within a line of poetry and forces readers
to slow down or pay greater notice to that line only because an institutionalized context claims as
much. As often stated, post-foundationalists maintain that assumptions or preconceptions
preexist and thus mediate meaning; in this case, those assumptions adopt the form of these
interpretive communities.
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Ultimately, Iser assumes that “gaps” or “indeterminacies” are “built into the text” (77)
and thus confined to certain words or passages which all readers can identify, while Fish claims
that indeterminacy is an inherent feature of all language. Any sense of determinacy is
constructed by contexts--or communities--which predate individuals and thus form their
perceptions. Agreement among readers regarding even these “cues” or skeletons of meaning
proves impossible as individuals from separate communities will approach texts through
drastically differently procedures. They will see extremely different works which will steer them
towards extremely different “processes” or experiences. Indeterminacy is the natural state of
language so that “there is no distinction between what the text gives and what the reader
supplies; he supplies everything” (77). To return to the astrological metaphor, “the stars in a
literary text are not fixed; they are just as variable as the lines that join them” (77). Iser attempts
to quarantine the ambiguous sections of language so as to preserve the text’s overall health and
stability; however, ambiguity is arguably a natural and incurable state.
However, critics should not simply lament such a reader’s influence over texts since texts
arguably could not possess any meaning otherwise. Eagleton explains that “Literary texts do not
exist on bookshelves; they are processes of signification materialized only in the practice of
reading” (65). Thus, a primary distinction between reader response theorists and other critics is
their embrace and celebration of a reader’s active, interpretive efforts rather than a fear of the
reader as interfering with the text’s intended, pure meaning. On the contrary, reader response
critics encourage readers to identify their initial assumptions or impressions regarding a text to
subsequently develop into more intricate interpretations.

C hapter 4
T homas Pynchon: A R ecluse with a Social I mpact
Besides two surprising voice appearances for episodes of The Simpsons which aired in
2003 and 2004, Thomas Pynchon communicates with his reading public only through his literary
works and the occasional essay (Royster 5). Compared to other contemporary authors such as
Sherman Alexie or Salman Rushdie, who each have Twitter accounts and make frequent public
appearances, he leads a borderline hermetic lifestyle. In fact, only a few photographs of Pynchon
from his high school and college years exist in public circulation 10. Therefore, Pynchon severely
constrains readers’ abilities to further explore his texts’ meanings through analysis of his own
past or present life. He lives as an embodiment of Barthes’s author who ceases to exist at the
moment of writing. His life seems a monumental metaphor for reader response theory which
hardly seems coincidental considering one may find a proliferation of post-foundational and
reader response themes throughout much of his works. A reader response criticism of these texts
may subsequently offer unique and valuable insights through which to consider some of postfoundationalists’ more distressing contradictions and social implications.
Post-foundational philosophers and reader response theorists--perhaps especially in the
case of Stanley Fish--often encounter difficulty while explaining their stances on the capacity for
individual or social change. If individuals’ embedded positions within societal contexts prevent
them from raising unbiased critiques against the system, then are persons forever doomed to the
status quo? If so, then how can post-foundationalists reconcile that position with their exuberant
praise of difference or with proven social changes of the past? Can communication between
parties facilitate such change? In other words, can separate parties possess or develop the
potential to effectively communicate and thereby alter one another’s epistemological
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foundations? Of course, these questions entail significant consequences for authors (or any other
artists) who seek to radically alter their audiences or larger social systems. Of course, people
have found multiple reasons to write or produce art apart from this desire to ignite change
including a sort of internal compulsion or catharsis. However, certain writers seek to use their
literature as a vehicle for social change. If post-foundational philosophy challenges people’s
abilities to step outside their ideological systems while reader response theory challenges
persons’ abilities to transparently or effectively communicate, then this ambition might appear
not only futile but presumptuous. As a reader invested in these postmodern theories and
preoccupied by such complexities, I often seek their explication (or at least exploration) as I
interpret the works of postmodern authors. Post-foundational philosophy and reader response
theory define meaning (whether in regards to a concrete world or a literary text) as contingent
upon the individual’s experiences and proclivities which themselves are largely determined by
context. My social and academic contexts have instilled me with a deep enthusiasm for literature
and literary theory as well as an inclination towards skepticism. Reader response theory seems to
best encompass these interests so that--appropriately enough--my response as a reader is
dominated by reader response theory. Of course, my interpretation of any literary text is also
influenced by my position within the major interpretive communities of the female gender and
the Western tradition. I thus fully acknowledge that this exploration of the reader’s experience
while interpreting Pynchon’s works primarily refers to a college educated, white, female reader.
According to Stanley Fish’s understanding of reader response theory, readers begin their
interpretations of Pynchon’s works simply by recognizing them as literary. They precede
interpretive efforts with such an assumption whether they consciously intend to or not, for this
“act of recognition” (Recognize a Poem 232) occurs prior to any singling out of textual features

or any interpretative constructions of broader meaning. Specifically, I identify Pynchon’s works
as respectable and meaningful largely because I encountered one of his most recognizable texts-The Crying of Lot 49--during an upper-division undergraduate English course. Consequently,
readers educated within a Western literary environment engage with this text in a literary
manner, which means they employ the interpretative strategies demonstrated and instilled by the
English academic community. For one, they assume (before even opening the front cover) that
the words, syntax, images, verbal tense, punctuation, and most other features will lend
themselves towards broader meanings. Of course, people can employ all language in such a
manner. Even a “Stop” sign encompassed by a pragmatic context which seems to ground the
message as a direct demand for a specific time and place can be read in a literary manner.
Graffiti painters’ frequent modifications of these signs with words like “War” or “Hatin’”
illustrate this point well. However, the assumptions surrounding literature within the academic
community render individuals more likely to read those texts deemed as “literary” for such
general insights. Additionally, readers assume the existence of connections between these
features and general insights which form even larger themes. Thus, the specific interpretations of
Pynchon’s works which readers construct from a multitude of interpretive communities and
personal experiences often originate from this basic mindset.
For these readers, their analyses of obstacles to change as a postmodern theme might
begin with a sense of familiarity with The Crying of Lot 49’s dissatisfied protagonist who seems
fixed within a closed textual world. The first significant detail of this text which readers might
note and foreground is that Oedipa Mass returns home “from a Tupperware party” (9), thus
characterizing her as a woman stuck within the traditional role of a housewife. Readers with
limited experience concerning such an event might simply focus upon the plastic containers
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themselves which allude to a sense of artificiality. Readers might also recall Tupperware’s use as
storage which allows persons to reuse and re-consume the same foods night after night so that
each evening seems identical to the next. But as a member of a female interpretive community
who attended such social functions with my mother, my understanding of this line is further
influenced by memories of women with uniformly styled sweaters sitting in a living room of
neutral tones as they buy and sell various similar products. In a sense, these female friends and
acquaintances sell one another the larger lifestyle associated with these products: days which
revolve around the regular and expected work of a household. Oedipa’s life has become a closed
system dominated by constantly rotating, traditional routines. Readers might then note the
passage in which Oedipa reflects upon her recent past only to recognize a “fat deckful of days
which seemed...more or less identical, or all pointing the same way subtly like a conjurer’s deck,
any odd one readily clear to a trained eye” (11) as it seems to reinforce this point. John P.
Leland’s article “Pynchon’s Linguistic Demon: The Crying of Lot 49” helps expand this
interpretation as it suggests this metaphor seems applicable not only to most individual
Americans’ lives but also to the aggregate nation itself. He primarily argues that Pynchon “may
view Western Civilization as a vast network of closed systems regressing endlessly upon
themselves as they confront the task of existence” (45). Mucho Maas seems to recognize this
national monotony during his time as a used car salesman, for he witnesses how “each owner,
each shadow, filed in only to exchange a dented, malfunctioning version of himself for another,
just as futureless, automotive projection of somebody else’s life” (14). A used car dealership
seems an apt metaphor for this vision of the United States since consumers might feel as though
they acquire new products (or identities) whereas they actually leave with old hand-me-downs.
The United States thus becomes a closed system of “endless, convoluted incest” (14) as the

individuals within it constantly model their own actions, perceptions, and images off one
another.
A reader’s familiarity with post-foundationalists such as Jean-Francois Lyotard likely
prompts them to diagnose dominant, foundational systems of thought as the main cause for such
monotony. Lyotard’s notion of meta-narratives suggest such stale, homogenous societies result
from humans’ tendency to organize the naturally random and convoluted world into common
patterns. Oedipa’s psychotherapist, Dr. Hilarius, attracts readers’ notice as they consider this
possibility since his obsession with Freudian theory illustrates how persons perceive the world
through intricately comprehensive frameworks. While experiencing what many would label a
nervous breakdown, he says, “I tried...to submit myself to that man...tried to cultivate a faith in
the literal truth of everything he wrote, even the idiocies and contradictions” (134). This sentence
relates nicely to Lyotard’s “meta-narratives” (qtd by Barry 87) or Fish’s analysis of supernarratives in which he explains that such thought in “its successive incarnations always deliver a
fully articulated world, a world without gaps or spots of unintelligibility. (This doesn’t mean that
everything is understood, but that even what is puzzling and mysterious is so in ways specific to
some elaborated system of thought” (Naturally 16). This is the equivalent of how a strict,
fundamentalist Christian will use notions such as “free will” to help explain most forms of
tragedy or evil which seemingly would not exist within a world created by a benevolent and
omnipotent God. Any other “spots of unintelligibility” (16) are similarly explained as God
testing persons to see whether they will freely choose the course of faith. Freudian
psychoanalysis and other theoretical systems have developed into such sophisticated and
intricate systems of thought that their internal logic can answer most challenges or even
incorporate/explain uncertainty or inconsistency. Of course, Dr. Hilarius submitted himself to
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Hitler and the Nazi party before these Freudian obsessions, so readers might consider a
connection between theoretical systems and Nazism. Many people likely consider intellectual
theorems, such as those of Freud, mostly innocuous. However, their authoritarian influence upon
a person’s range of thoughts and their intolerance towards dissent or contradiction render them at
least comparable to the most fascist of systems.
As readers further analyze this theme of ontological nihilism, they might connect Dr.
Hilarius’s penchant for fascist figures and ideologies with references to the natural sciences-mainly with Pynchon’s discussion of the second law of thermodynamics. Lyons and Franklin
describe the second law of thermodynamics in laymen's terms, pointing out that molecules in a
chamber naturally arrange themselves “in a completely random pattern” (196) and would only
find order if man introduced a partition into the chamber and sorted the molecules through some
mechanical device such as a pump. Readers could further associate this process with Maxwell’s
Demon which (allegedly) sits within Nefastis’s device to sort his molecules into hot and cold
categories ( Lot 49 105). Readers might finally connect this scientific principle and this emphasis
upon sorting with the overarching image of Oedipa Maas who embarks on a quest to organize
her random inputs of information into a satisfying truth--the system of the Tristero (Lyons and
Franklin198). Her entire journey thus mirrors individuals’ tendency to organize data through
popularly touted and intricately developed ideologies, such as that of Freud, so that they
eventually perceive and act in the world in much the same way.
References to Remedio Varo’s painting “Embroidering Earth’s Mantle” provide readers
with further opportunities to explain humanity’s dependence upon pre-established patterns-perhaps opportunities which better appeal to those with intellectual backgrounds in the
humanities. Oedipa recalls how she and Inverarity simultaneously viewed this image of

“prisoners in the top room of a circular tower, embroidering a kind of tapestry which spilled out
the slit windows and into a void, seeking to fill the void” (Lot 49 21). This “void” refers to the
painting’s backdrop characterized by dark and formless clouds (or fog) which invites a menacing
feeling in some viewers through their lack of expression. For the post-foundational reader, this
backdrop recalls the natural order of the world; it is the molecules without the partition. The
tapestry may then represent totalising theories which seek to “fill,” or overcome, this sense of
meaninglessness. As further support, Oedipa explains that the tapestry contained all of existence
so that “the tapestry was the world” (21). As in the case of reading a text, viewers’
interpretations of this painting are further influenced by their experience foregrounding and
disregarding various details due to personal dispositions. I specifically note how the world inside
this tapestry--composed of a bright gold and a comforting, silky texture--initially seems far more
engrossing in comparison to the backdrop. In fact, I solely focused upon this design when I first
viewed the painting until I forced myself to turn my attention to the reality behind. Like Oedipa,
I completely ignored and nearly forgot the sinisterly robed figure meddling with some strange
device which seems to bind the women in a hypnotic energy. For certain readers, such an
experience lends itself to an emotional revelation which the scientific theorem cannot.
Individuals adopt overarching explanations because they fear a world without any inherent truths
with which to navigate. They keep their heads turned away from these narratives’ sources in
order to ignore the possibility that these narratives were in fact constructed. Encompassing
ideologies, like the tapestry, allow people to feel safe in a world characterized by order and
reliability. That this picture causes Oedipa to cry suggests she is among the majority who desires
such ontological security. Even if people could step outside their contexts of faux orders and
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false assumptions of truth, they would arguably prove unwilling to plunge into that ominous
vacuum.
However, the second law of thermodynamics also suggests that the comfort provided by
such closed systems cannot last. Instead, these closed systems will result in even greater levels of
chaos. Stanley Koteks, an inventor at the company of Oedipa’s former boyfriend, informs her of
the term “entropy” which readers grasp onto as one of the few unifying concepts throughout the
novel. The second law of thermodynamics informs us that all closed systems experience a
gradual decline into disorder or chaos until they ultimately collapse. The devices which establish
order (such as the pump) ultimately require energy themselves, and “the amount of disorder
created by the action of the pump on the environment of the experiment is either equal to or
greater than the amount of order created in the system” (Lyons and Franklin 196). Information
theory appropriated this premise and presents it in more approachable terms. This theory
suggests that humans “pay for the order we impose on experience” since “the gain in order
arranged by the process never quite balances the disorder in the environment of the subject
acquiring information by the endeavor” (198). Readers might interpret this statement to suggest
that it requires much energy to create patterns where none naturally exist or, in other words, to
organize our world according to a formula. Lyons and Franklin point out that Oedipa’s initial
reaction to Maxwell’s Demon reaffirms the difficulty of sorting (201). Koteks explains to her
that “since the demon only sat and sorted, you wouldn’t have to put any real work into the
system” (86) to which she responds, “Sorting isn’t work?...Tell them down at the post office,
you’ll find yourself in a mailbag headed to Fairbanks, Alaska, without even a FRAGILE sticker
going for you” (86). This notion also helps explain the exhaustion felt by Oedipa after she spends
an entire night attempting to organize signs dispersed all over town into the single system or

explanation of the Tristero. This energy we exert through our sorting creates havoc since we
must manipulate our world to fit within this predetermined pattern. As readers find later in the
novel, our good friend Dr. Hilarius further illustrates this point as he grows insane attempting to
structure his life in the “perfect safety” (135) of Freudian theory. He devolves from a strictly
disciplined behavior and logic (one he dedicates his life towards instilling in others) to an
unstable state in which he can acknowledge no form of reason and can only cause destruction
Thus, post-foundational theory can account for change in the form of devolution tending
towards eventual destruction or chaos. A significant percentage of the population eventually
grows bored, exhausted, or perhaps frustrated and disillusioned as they continually structure their
understandings and lives to fit within an ideological system. Eventually, the pressures built up by
such conformity reach such high levels that they must eventually escape through various acts of
dissent. Individuals do not necessarily engage in conscious or articulate critiques but rather act
upon an instinctual need to break down and thereby break free from the ideological patterns in
which they are embedded.
In fact, postmodern countercultural movements often emphasize such forms of change as
best exemplified by punk communities’ appeals to “cultural resistance.” Stephen Duncombe’s
Cultural Resistance Reader defines this movement as “culture that is used, consciously or
unconsciously, effectively or not, to resist and/or change the dominant political, economic, and/
or social structure” (5). Duncombe’s personal experience as a punk rock activist helps further
illustrate this process of destructive change as he recalls being raised and embedded within a
white, suburban Post-World War II context until he encountered the vague feeling that
“something was wrong” (3). He describes how the heterosexual, male, middle-class normative
values seemed somehow insufficient and “to top it off, I was bored” (3). For him and many of his
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contemporaries, punk seemed “a release, an escape valve for my political dissatisfaction” (5)
with its debasement of social norms and cries of defiance such as “I am an anti-Christ/ I am an
anarchist (Sex Pistols qtd by Duncombe 3). Punk rejects the embellishments of previous musical
traditions by stripping songs down to simple beats and lyrics 11 as well as expresses an
impassioned, disordered energy which relates particularly well to entropic decay. As Duncombe
admits, Punk typically never presumes to prescribe alternative modes of knowing or social
systems and thus never entails productive forms of change, but rather tears down previous
assumptions and standards of conduct as a force of sweeping destruction. In this sense, change
doesn’t require individuals to consciously step outside their ideological systems. Fish notes such
an unfettered critical position is a near impossibility; however, change can occur from
individuals’ unconscious (nearly visceral) needs to demolish certain aspects of the system. In
other words, individuals do not need to gain an objective view from outside the system where
they can launch a conscious, eloquent critique in order to enact change. Punk “had no strategic
plan; it had no plan at all” (5) but proved able to engage in a spontaneous destruction of certain
norms from within the system.
However, many people might find themselves less than satisfied or encouraged to know
that they possess the capability for social demolition. Certain readers may then consider ways in
which society can escape from banality through more productive means which stand apart from
mere opposition to previous conventions. The second law of thermodynamics again proves
relevant as it claims that closed systems prevent the course of entropy through new injections of
energy. As readers question whether such injections are indeed possible, they may identify
individuals’ capacity for imagination as a possible solution. Oedipa’s quest to uncover an
underground postal conspiracy ends in uncertainty as data convincingly alludes to both its

existence and her own delusions; her findings point to “either Oedipa in the orbiting ecstasy of a
true paranoia, or a real “Tristero” (Pynchon, Lot 49 182). Whether or not Oedipa fantasizes the
Tristero, falls for a hoax, or fantasizes a hoax is in some ways irrelevant. That she can even
consider the possibility of this alternative system may prove enough to combat conformity and
entropy. Oedipa asks Dr. Hilarius to “talk [her] out of [this] fantasy” (138) as one who treats
mental disorders should do according to societal standards. Readers thus feel surprised and
perhaps heartened as he responds, “Cherish it!...What else do any of you have?...don’t let the
Freudians coax it away or the pharmacists poison it out of you” (138). He explains that “when
you lose it you go over by that much to the others” (138). If one acknowledges that all systematic
explanations of reality are actually fictions, then he or she cannot fear risking or losing either
stability or truth. One cannot lose the foundation which never existed in the first place. Thus, the
post-foundationalist may find himself or herself liberated to serve as his or her own architect of
reality.
However, readers may complicate this view as characters with the most unconventionally
fanciful or avant-garde beliefs and lifestyles often seem the most constrained. Oedipa finds a
variety of subcultures throughout the novel—the concealed populations perhaps too small and
diminutive to even count as minorities—who most persons hear about yet fail to directly
encounter. These characters model their lives around “calculated withdrawal,” (124); they are
disappointed that they cannot simply withdraw “into a vacuum,” so they must exist in the
“separate, silent, unsuspecting world” (125). They include rightwing extremists, a night
watchmen who eats ivory soap, transexuals, and artists. However, their lives all seem as dull and
unfulfilling as those who readers would associate with the dominant culture. Mr. Fresno proves
especially pitiable. That he uses the WASTE system and abandoned his wife suggests he chose
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the life of an outcast as an escape from the dominating patterns of mass society. However, he
finds himself “huddled, shaking with grief” (125) as his life is reduced to the front step of his
own building and the mattress which holds every “tearfully consummated wet dream” (126). His
letter expresses his desire to reconnect. However, he has spent so much time in alienation--the
only physical contact occurring in his own unconscious mind--that he no longer knows how to
rejoin the outside world. He hands Oedipa the letter so she can mail it for him, explaining that he
“can’t go out there. It’s too far now” (125). Oedipa seems to accept these words for their literal
value; however, readers might assume that he has dedicated his life to escaping entropy only to
find his own mind became a closed system which succumbed to the second law of
thermodynamics. One thus cannot fight entropy by simply pulling out of a majority system. If
one attempts to fight entropy simply through internalization or by attaching to reclusive counter
systems, then he or she will simply become trapped within an alternative system of entropy.
Readers might thus hypothesize that interactions between separate individuals and groups
can provide one another with the new injections of energy required to maintain ordinary levels of
chaos. Jesus Arrabal, member of the Anarquistas, expresses this sentiment when he reflects upon
his encounter with Inverarity. Arrabal, though a radical, holds some deep appreciation for this
embodiment of the bourgeoisie as he says, “You know what a miracle is. Not what Bakunin said.
But another world’s intrusion into our own.” (120). When members from highly different
background conditions who interpret the world in highly different ways come into contact, a sort
of “cataclysm” (120) might occur. Readers might interpret “cataclysm” in its literal as opposed
to pejorative form, suggesting such contact produces a monumental event that transforms what
persons considered the natural world. Even if such inter-world contact occurs in the form of
aggression (as in the West’s imperial interaction with colonized states), persons encounter

contrary and previously unimagined ways of thinking and existing in the world. What seemed
natural and thus objectively true might now appear as an idiosyncrasy developed by specific
persons in response to specific conditions in a specific time and place. Using the imagery of
Remedio Varos, collision might produce at least small tears in one’s tapestry which could allow
him or her to look around themselves to catch a glimpse of these notions’ human origins.
Persons might even find aspects of these contrary systems enlightening or applicable to
their own situations, and these new insights might combine with aspects of their previous
ideology to form something previously unimagined by any existing perspective. An example
might include Anarcho-Syndicaism which combines the anarchist emphasis upon individualism
and distrust towards authoritative systems with syndicalism’s (somewhat Marxist) emphasis
upon unions and cooperation to form the vision of voluntary and “spontaneous” systems of
cooperation which avoid the abuses of hierarchy or power (121). Readers might connect
Arrabal’s miracle of worlds colliding with I nherent Vice’s references to Locard’s Exchange
Principle--a theorem from forensic science which claims “every contact leaves traces” (212).
When persons come into physical contact, they both leave at least tiny traces of themselves upon
one another in the form of small hairs, fibers from clothes, fingerprints, etc. Consequently, some
sort of blending occurs when persons from different interpretive communities are brought into
some association.
Despite such potential cases of significant social change, the reader’s experience while
interpreting Pynchon’s most recent work--I nherent Vice--seems marked by a more skeptical
approach. Readers’ interpretations of this novel--set within the countercultural ambitions of
1960s Southern California--are heavily influenced by their twenty-first century perspective,
which generally reflects back upon this period with a disillusioned sense of failure. Joseph
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Heath’s and Andrew Potter’s Nation of Rebels: Why Counterculture Became Consumer Culture
illustrates this defeatist outlook as it argues the 1960s countercultural movements proved
insufficient to radically overturn most so-called mainstream orders. During the 1960s, baby
boomers sought some alternative to the materialism of a capitalist society only for consumerism
to “emerge from decades of countercultural rebellion much stronger than it was before” (5).
Today, corporations possess more influence than ever before through deregulation and court
rulings like Citizens United v. F .E .C; global distributions of wealth remain stubbornly
disproportionate; and people remain saturated by the advertising which perpetuates their
obsessive need for consumption (8). Baby boomers also hoped to dismantle the mass society
which promoted the discriminatory norms and interests of its white, male, heterosexual, western,
upper-class members. While recent decades have witnessed certain advancements for these
oppressed groups, few would presume to describe this present period as fundamentally unique or
free from these concerns of the past.
Of course, one who reads The Crying of Lot 49 in the present day is also influenced by
this contemporary viewpoint. However, readers’ perceptions of the conditions under which these
novels were produced suggest a crucial distinction. The Crying of Lot 49 and I nherent Vice prove
structurally similar as they are both set amongst countercultural movements of 1960s Southern
California; however, Pynchon wrote the former during the 1960s in the midst of these
revolutionary efforts whereas he wrote the latter during this present century in the midst of
revolutionary disappointment and exhaustion. Most readers might thus assume that Pynchon
writes the previous text from a more optimistic perspective or at least from an approach of
greater uncertainty and curiosity regarding the capacity of these movements to enact their
intended changes. Similarly, most readers will assume that Pynchon writes this latter text from a

more pessimistic perspective or at least from an awareness of certain countercultural
disappointments. One might specifically expect Pynchon to grapple with or attempt to explain
these perceived failures. Louis Menand’s review for The New Yorker illustrates this assumption
as he claims “the twist is the time period” since Pynchon sets the novel when “the sand is
running out on the counterculture” (3). He concludes by proposing that the novel’s
“countercultural California is a lost continent of freedom and play, swallowed up by the faceless
forces of co-optation and repression” (4). Of course, these identifications of Pynchon’s
perspectives are (like the texts) mere constructs based upon the reader’s own assumptions.
Readers cannot know for certain whether Pynchon actually viewed countercultural movements
with a more favorable or optimistic lens as he wrote The Crying of Lot 49 nor whether he
approached countercultural movements from a more cynical outlook as he wrote I nherent Vice.
However, most readers will project the prevailing attitudes of these time periods upon Pynchon
and interpret the texts accordingly.
At this point, readers might agree that such assumptions regarding Pynchon’s perspective
likely influence people from interpretive communities which value such pursuit of authorial
intent; yet, they may argue that these assumptions cannot influence those guided by the
community of reader response theory. If a reader response critic rejects the potential for readers
to confidently identify authorial intent, then why would he or she even bother to speculate upon
authors or their perspectives? Arguably, reader response critics prove similar to most other
readers in that they find themselves interested in the text’s production. Though they hold less
faith then others in the ability for readers to fully understand the intent of an author or the
pervading mood of a different time and/ or place integral to the text’s composition, reader
response critics arguably still find themselves interested in the text’s source. In the absence of
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objective means to understand the text’s author or its original zeitgeist, reader response critics
likely construct or imagine such origins. This point relates to Derrida’s suggestion that the author
as he/she actually exists disappears “even in the original moment of [a work’s] production” (46)
because he/she is thereafter “never transparently present but must be interpreted or ‘read’ into
being” (47). Reader response critics might reasonably find themselves speculating as to the
author or the milieu from which a text originates; however, they would recognize such
understandings of textual sources as mere speculations.
Specifically, this skeptical and distrustful perspective might encourage readers to develop
a sense of misgiving in response to the mysterious forces which seem to constantly lurk behind
the scenes. From the novel’s opening page, one might assume that these shadowy figures exist to
curtail any unorthodox behaviors amongst its characters. In particular, the narrator first describes
Doc’s former girlfriend--Shasta--as “looking just like she swore she’d never look” (1). Readers
might interpret her transformation as from a 1960s beach-bum with hippie sympathies to the
trophy girlfriend of a real-estate mogul who embodies the dominant, mid-nineteenth century’s
definition of femininity. She previously donned bikini bottoms with a “Country Joe & The Fish
T-shirt” which recalls the would-be-subversive 1960s rocks bands driven by anti-war themes and
psychedelics. Presently, she dons a “flatland” (1) style and short hair which (in addition to
allusions to her movie-star good looks and platinum coloring) allows readers to view her as a
pinup girl created and displayed to fulfill the influential man’s fantasy. Readers might reinforce
such a perception as they encounter the painted image of Shasta on Mickey Wolfmann’s silk tie
“in a pose submissive enough to break an ex--old man’s heart” (190). Shasta not only submits to
Wolfmann’s desires but to the expectations and demands of a traditional, patriarchal society. She
changes from Jefferson Airplane’s Grace Slick to Marilyn Monroe. Readers might respond to

this apparently sudden and dramatic shift with a considerable level of curiosity regarding its
source or cause.
One might assume she voluntarily embraced the dominant culture--she simply “sold out.”
However, other readers might interpret her subtle allusions to surveillance to suggest that
formidable guardians of the status quo compel her in some way towards conformity. Upon her
reunion with Doc (who readers may view as her remaining link to counterculture), she nervously
attempts to portray their meeting as non-subversive. She explains, “I thought, better for
everybody if this looks like a secret rendezvous” (1) which suggests she hopes to portray their
meeting as an illicit affair--more preferable to the powers-at-be than insurrection. Doc further
asks, “Somebody’s keepin a close eye?” to which she explains that she is “trying to make it look
good” (1). Such desire to “look good” and maintain social pretenses even on a seemingly
deserted street at the dead of night suggests people are never left truly alone. At the very least,
people feel as though constantly under the authoritative gaze. Through such a perspective, this
novel’s narration adopts a particularly disturbing quality in readers’ minds. A nameless, thirdperson narrative voice traces Shasta’s steps as though from a discreet distance as when it notes,
“She came along the alley and up the back steps” or “They stood in the street light through the
kitchen window” (1). These lines recall the “stalker angle” often employed in slasher films
which emphasize a woman’s entrapment within a male gaze. (131) These vague allusions to
surveillance thus instill readers with a sense of distrust and paranoia towards such overriding,
authoritative control--including the control of the narration itself.
Readers--especially those with at least basic understandings of postmodern philosophy-might find themselves additionally surprised and confounded by these forces as Pynchon seems
to describe them as somewhat foundational. These forces seem foundational in that they appear
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both permanent and widespread as though part of an underlying and common condition of
humanity. Puck Beaverton refers to these forces as the“ Mob behind the Mob” (248) which one
might interpret literally as the main criminal organization employing smaller organizations as
shields or covers. However, readers might interpret this line as referring to a condition of human
nature which underlies and prompts such efforts for control and domination over others. Readers
might support this notion by referencing the novel’s striking title--I nherent Vice. Sauncho--Doc’s
friend and a maritime lawyer--defines inherent vice as “what you can’t avoid...stuff marine
policies don’t like to cover. Usually applies to cargo--like eggs break--but sometimes it’s also the
vessel carrying it” (351). Laura Miller’s review expresses this interpretation as she points
towards references to Charles Manson which disturb many as “evidence of the inherent vice in
humanity itself, the seeds of violence, idolatry, and the abuse of power that no utopian plan can
hope to eradicate” (2). Many readers know vice as a general “depravity or corruption of morals”
as expressed by “indulgence in degrading pleasures or practices” (OED). However, readers with
awareness of the word’s wider etymology recognize that vice can also refer more specifically to
the tendency of persons to treat others “arrogantly or oppressively” (OED). Thus, the novel’s
shadowy forces may appear to embody humans’ long-standing tendency to “indulge in the
degrading pleasure or practice” of treating others “arrogantly or oppressively.”
Readers may further ground this human proclivity within the human desire for material
items and pleasures obtained through the exploitation of disadvantaged populations. Pursuit of
recreational drugs, food, money, and sex seem to dominate most of the characters’ waking lives.
Many characters--including the congenial hero-protagonist named Doc--additionally seem to
revert to exploitive and demeaning behavior towards others in order to acquire such comforts.
Female readers likely find Doc’s seemingly carnal desire for sexual domination particularly

disturbing as when he hopes to reenact Charles Manson’s master--slave relationship with his
hippie “chicks” (304). Readers from the female interpretive community might find Shasta
particularly insightful as she accuses Doc of desiring “Submissive, brainwashed, horny little
teenagers...who do exactly what you want before you even know what that is” (304). Perhaps
even more disturbing to readers, Doc finds himself aroused by Shasta’s recollections of sexual
enslavement onboard the Golden Fang and readily accepts once she “presented herself” (307) in
a pose similar to the one he found so heartbreaking and offensive when displayed on Mickey’s
tie.
A reader might reconcile this seemingly foundational vice with a postfoundational novel
through unique interpretation of the referenced Eastern philosophy. Readers encounter multiple
allusions to karma and karmic loops which some might interpret as appeals to a foundational
view of an orderly universe structured around necessary, direct relations between cause and
effect. However, readers influenced by a postfoundational community might interpret Pynchon’s
use of karmic imagery solely as a reference to the expressions or outcomes of persons’ acts and
choices. When discussing the Golden Fang, Sauncho describes the “Tentacles of sin and desire
and that strange world-bound karma which is of the essence of maritime law” (emphasis mine
91). Such depravity and desire seem the essence of maritime law (and society writ large) not
necessarily due to a transcendental system of truth or a basic human condition but because of a
worldly notion of karma in which human actions influence the shape of future people and the
societies they construct. So long as individuals seek to acquire desires through the subordination
of others--or even seek pleasure from the act of domination itself--human society will find itself
constantly shaped and controlled by these same, basic forces. So long as these desires reign over
humanity, the most powerful of individuals will continue to find the motives and justifications to
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force the remainder of us into submissive and familiar molds. Ultimately, these forces of vice
appear quite skilled at maintaining such influence.
Throughout I nherent Vice, various characters and systems engaged in rebellion often
disappear only to return as proponents of these conventional systems, which prompts many
readers’ attempts to solve the mystery surrounding these reactionary forces’ means of so
regaining control. As previously mentioned, Shasta returns from over a year-long absence with a
drastically de-radicalized appearance. Shortly after, a clandestine organization abducts her
billionaire boyfriend (Mickey Wolfmann) while he is in the midst of a radical lifestyle change.
Many of Mickey’s acquaintances insinuate that this abduction was preceded and influenced by
his desire to escape the bourgeoise worldview of a capitalist system by donating the bulk of his
fortune. A former bodyguard recalls how Mickey intended to build a rent-free housing complex
as he explained, “I wish I could undo what I did, I know I can’t, but I bet I can make the money
start to flow in a different direction” (150). Readers with a decent understanding of Marxist
theory would recognize the revolutionary potential of this act, for Wolfmann’s donations amount
to not only a significant redistribution of wealth but also a major paradigm shift away from the
exclusive concern over materialism and profit. However, Wolfmann returns from his hiatus
“reprogrammed” (252) back into his previous, entrepreneurial self who immediately cancels the
philanthropic project. Similarly, an electric surf12 band known as The Boards begins as an
expression of countercultural California only for various members to disappear so that the band
“changed personnel so often that it...had evolved into pretty much a brand name” (126). Once
certain members are isolated and de-neutralized, the band morphs from a subversive voice to a
harmless product packaged and sold like everything else within the system. In particular, the
saxophonist known as Coy Harlingen disappears by faking his own death only to reemerge as a

secret infiltrator and operative for a counter-subversive, conservative organization known as
Vigilant California. Readers might seize upon this last example to note that enigmatic,
traditionalist forces seize control in each of these cases through infiltration, which allows them to
undermine these movements from the inside.
Thus, readers with knowledge of countercultural movements and concepts might explain
the failures of radical change as the consequence of pervasive authorities’ ability to de-radicalize
countercultural symbols and systems in a process known as co-optation. Heath’s and Potter’s
survey of countercultural movements defines co-option as the process whereby “the system tries
merely to assimilate resistance by appropriating its symbols, evacuating their ‘revolutionary’
content and then selling them back to the masses as commodities” which results in neutralization
(34). Through such subtle infiltration, reactionary powers can avoid direct and overt aggression.
In fact, the system manages to hide behind a facade of tolerance so that failure of subversive
movements appears due to their own shortcomings. With such a concept in mind, readers can
interpret much of the novel’s imagery accordingly. As previously noted, a reader instructed by
the interpretive community of undergraduate literary studies assumes that the imagery within a
text (at least one written by an author as well-reputed as Thomas Pynchon) alludes to some
general significance. Such readers will likely to appeal towards the schooner known as The
Golden Fang for such meaning since it dominates so many of the characters’ lives or interests
and seems one of the few images to circulate throughout the entire text. Because different owners
employ the Golden Fang for multiple different purposes, different readers will necessarily
associate this image with a multiplicity of separate meanings. For certain readers, the
degeneration of the honest-working fishing boat known as The Preserved into a vehicle for
counter-subversive activities seems a metaphor for the process of co-optation. Burke Stodger, a
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famous film star labeled as a Marxist during the age of blacklisting, purchased the fishing vessel
to escape public retribution (Pynchon I nherent Vice 92). Afterwards, counter-subversive
organizations claimed the craft (renamed the Golden Fang) for various projects in Guatemala,
West Africa, and other areas “whose names were blocked out” (95) from the official files. The
Golden Fang delivers weapons to anti-Communist guerilla forces, monitors communist
coastlines, and even transports “CIA heroin from the Golden Triangle” (95). A vessel which
literally served as a haven for radical Marxist politics and therefore stood as a symbol for that
subversive movement is seized by reactionary forces, stripped of its radical nature, and employed
to defeat the very cause which it previously served. Readers might thus interpret The Preserved
as an ironic title for this ship which cannot maintain its original state of opposition. If dominant
authorities manage to gain internal access to these opposition movements, then their members
lose control over their own efforts and watch as their subversions prove subverted.
Of course, readers might then ask themselves how such reactionary authorities manage to
infiltrate opposition movements so effectively in the first place. Ultimately, the confusion of
readers as they attempt to circumnavigate this complex text in which persons adopt multiple,
contradictory roles alludes to some explanation. Throughout the novel, readers feel misled and
ultimately disoriented as characters previously deemed innocent or even victimized later seem
manipulative and disingenuous. In particular, readers might later interpret Shasta as a more
informed and commanding figure than outward appearances initially suggest. Upon reuniting
with Doc, Shasta portrays herself as powerless amidst the rumors of an attempted plot against
Wolfmann as when she describes herself as “just the bait” (3). She likens herself to a trapped
prey on the low end of the food chain--or hierarchy of power--involuntarily used for others’
nefarious demands. After Wolfmann’s disappearance, the LAPD spots Shasta leaving the

country aboard the Golden Fang, which some readers may interpret as an abduction and further
proof of her role as damsel-in-distress. Doc initially interprets her disappearance in such a
manner, and Shasta herself later corroborates this story. Even the District Attorneys’ Office
views her as merely another troubled girl who unwittingly walked into peril: “some hippy chick
with boyfriend trouble, brains all discombobulated with dope sex rock ‘n‘ roll” (69).
However, readers and Doc might also interpret her departure as voluntary and thus proof
of many troubling possibilities including her cooperation with this commanding organization.
Doc reasons she may have found herself involved in something “so heavy duty” (95) that
betraying Wolfmann proved her only means of escape. Of course, Doc even complicates this
interpretation as he thinks, “Assuming she even wanted out. Maybe she really wanted to remain
in whatever it was, and Mickey stood in the way” (emphasis his 95). Later details indeed allow
readers to interpret Shasta, not only as involved, but as a primary figure within the plot against
Wolfmann and within even larger counter-subversive efforts. In particular, Shasta introduced
Coy Harlingen to Vigilant California which alludes to her extended involvement and influence
within its operations. Wolfmann’s bodyguard further recalls how Shasta considered her
boyfriend “crazy” for wanting to relinquish his fortune, and “for some reason it scared her” (150)
which perhaps indicates her true, conservative nature. The bodyguard still maintains her
innocence as he assumes she truly “was in love with him” (150) and consequently interprets her
concern as regarding Mickey’s own safety. How readers interpret Shasta proves highly
instrumental for their interpretations of the larger text, for it calls into question why she engages
in a relationship with Wolfmann and which of these parties actually co-opts the other. If readers
interpret Shasta as the agent of co-optation, then the less conspicuous person of the pair proves
the actual instrument of authority. Such reactionary forces gain their influence largely through
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their ability to adopt more forms than the obvious white, male, elite symbol of patriarchy. Doc
best reflects readers’ sense of confusion and distrust one he discovers Shasta’s picture within a
Golden Fang building and thinks to himself, “The world had just been disassembled, anybody
here could be working any hustle you could think of, and it was long past time to be, as Shaggy
would say, like, getting out of here, Scoob” (190). In the end, co-optation proves such an
effective defense against countercultural movements because people are largely incapable of
piercing through the surface levels (or impressions) of others’ words and actions.
In a similar manner, readers feel rather disconcerted as they largely fail in their attempts
to specify a clear course or set of main features for this narrative. Menand notes this initial
impression as he states, “Plotwise, there are probably too many pieces of the puzzle to hold in
your head, and its not completely clear where, or whether, every piece fits” (2). The plot of
I nherent Vice initially seems to revolve around a private investigator known as Doc while he
inquires into the seemingly related crimes of kidnapping and murder at Wolfmann’s latest
development project. Thus, readers identify the genre as detective fiction and subsequently
develop multiple assumptions. Readers mainly assume that a single, coherent mystery (some
question or puzzle) lies at the center of this text which further details progressively clarify or
resolve. However, readers struggle not only to solve this text’s mystery but to even define the
nature or crux of the mystery itself. Even Doc seems unable to clearly and simply define the
central point--or essence--of the mystery in which he finds himself embroiled. He seems to find
persons of interest either by pure chance or through their own efforts to locate him. These
people’s separate experiences and the cases for which they enlist Doc all seem to relate through
either similar names or places; however, these connections seem so indeterminate and partial that
neither Doc nor the readers can identify a main, unifying premise. The case seems to begin with

a coincidence: Shasta informs Doc of a plot construed by Mrs. Mickey Wolfmann to kidnap and
commit her husband, and a separate client entreats Doc to visit a man named Glen Charlock at
Wolfmann’s latest construction site for some form of payment. Shortly after Doc arrives at
Channel View Estates, he loses consciousness only to find Glen slaughtered and the billionaire
developer missing. Readers thus identify the central point of the case (and thus the novel’s plot)
as “What happened to Glen Charlock and Mickey Wolfmann?” Once various associates and
members of the community imply his connections (such as laundering) with the sinister
organization known as the Golden Fang, the mystery seems to revolve around the question,
“What is the Golden Fang?”
However, the case evolves to appear far more disparate and complex than originally
assumed as the Golden Fang proves merely one component within a larger network of
controlling, nefarious forces. Later developments unearth the existence of another clandestine,
anti-subversive operation known as Vigilant California which seems at least as important as The
Golden Fang. The text describes Vigilant California as a group of “GOP activists” (139);
however, one might interpret this title ironically since the political and social change for which
they campaign seems to merely reverse any countercultural gains in defense of the status quo.
According to one of its operatives, they engage in a panoply of reactionary efforts ranging from
the bribing of politicians to the infiltration of universities and other revolutionary hotspots.
Arguably, the purposes and actions of Vigilant California only seem more opaque due to its
vague connections with the Golden Fang, such as the common link of Chryskylodon. The
Golden Fang appears to own and operate this upscale psychiatric and detoxification center; in
fact, Doc translates its name to mean a “gold fang” in Greek (185). Doc later finds Coy
Harlingen--a Vigilant California operative--within the confines of this facility, and Coy admits
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that his bosses often channel him towards there for regular detoxification and indoctrination
(301). To add to this confusion, scraps of evidence arise which suggest connections between the
Golden Fang and Internal Affaires of the LAPD. For one, Doc encounters a photograph of men
associated with the LAPD who are in possession of counterfeit currency printed by the Golden
Fang. According to Doc’s interpretation, the men in the photograph stand on a pier where they
look as though “they just got off, or were maybe about to get on, the Golden F ang” (287). To
complicate matters even further, the LAPD and Vigilant California also seem connected through
Coy Harlingen who (according to police files) works as an undercover informant for “many farflung outposts of law enforcement...and levels of power” (209-210). Finally, all three
organizations seem united by Wolfmann’s disappearance since investigations eventually reveal
that a citizens’ “counterguerrilla” (201) squad operated by Vigilant California directly carried out
the kidnapping, yet delivered him to the Golden Fang’s Chryskylodon for various forms of
reprogramming. The LAPD seems implicated at least through association since the department
often employs the same “counterguerrilla” squad for operations in which they either “can’t
commit the manpower” or cannot allow themselves to become implicated (201).
Because these institutions seem so convoluted, readers and characters encounter
difficulty as they try to determine which organization or figure unites all of these activities as a
premiere or guiding force. Coy himself seems unable to establish a hierarchy as the narrator
explains, “It didn’t take long for Coy to become aware that the patriots who were running him
were being run themselves by another level of power altogether, which seemed entitled to fuck
with the lives of all who weren’t as good or bright as they were, which meant everybody” (301).
Readers thus seem to directly encounter the limits of human logic and reason as they must
default towards conjecture in their attempts to explain these connections. Each of the

organizations seems equally linked with the others and thus equally likely to stand as the head of
this syndicate. Doc expresses this uncertainty well as he inspects photos of the raid at Channel
View Estates and the faces of Glen’s murderers with such intensity that they begin “to float apart
into little blobs of color...as if whatever had happened had reached some kind of limit” (351).
Doc concludes his investigation by affirming only that “built into the act of return finally was
this glittering mosaic of doubt” (351). The more one investigates a case, the more initial patterns
break down into individual pieces of data whose relations to one another seem increasingly
uncertain or ambiguous. As Doc begins to realize the intensely intertwined nature of these
various organizations, he exclaims, “now what the fuck?” which perhaps best expresses the
reader’s reaction. Readers ultimately find themselves frustrated and disappointed to realize that
the novel’s vice and co-optation reside not within some single, unified organization like the
Golden Fang but rather within multiple organizations with uncertain connections and hierarchies.
This lack of a clearly identified authority only erects another barrier for those readers seeking
some radical change in the system. Ironically, the postmodern theory of interpretation and
uncertainty seems to help hide and protect these secret sources of power. If sources of authority
prove similar to all other matters in that they defy any objective or confident explanation, then
dissidents find any attempts to combat their influence severely hindered just as Stanley Fish
warned.
Finally, post-structuralist views of language which scholars like Fish develop into a
radical, reader-response emphasis upon interpretation seem to complicate efforts for change even
further. The most optimistic and productive stimuli for change uncovered through Pynchon’s
works--the “miracle” of worlds’ collisions--relies upon human interaction. It depends upon the
capacity for people from separate interpretive communities to understand each other (even if

64

under antagonistic conditions) well enough to have any hope for mutual influence; thus, it
seemingly requires a certain level of transparency in language. John Nefastis expresses this point
as he asserts, “Communication is the key” (Lot 49 105) to the successful application of his
device. The “sensitive” must receive the demon’s data and provide “something like the same
quantity of information” (105) so that the separate parties provide one another with needed, new
inputs. Unfortunately, this omnipresence 13 of authority severely subdues persons’ willingness to
even attempt such clarity as they monitor their own language by consciously relying upon
insinuation or preterition. Throughout Inherent Vice, readers encounter a sense of distance from
the scenes and characters as well as (once again) more confusion due to the vague nature of most
dialogue. Characters seem unwilling to speak openly to persons outside themselves let alone
outside an interpretive community due to the fear of some authoritative surveillance. For
example, Doc finds Coy within his own home only for Coy to gesture towards some sound
equipment while shaking his head (131). Their conversation thus deteriorates into an ambiguous
collection of coded language in which the reader is uncertain as to whether or not the characters
even understand the subject of their discussion.
As previously noted, members of countercultural communities seem especially likely to
exclude perceived outsiders through such intentional obscurity. Oedipa faces such difficulty
tracking the Tristero mainly because the communities she meets refuse to attempt any
meaningful engagement with her. They offer summary mentions or hints of the Tristero but
disregard or cease such statements immediately afterwards, such as during the Jacobean tragedy
when “a gentle chill, an ambiguity begins to creep in among the words” in what Oedipa calls “a
ritual reluctance” (71). She notes how “Certain things, it is made clear, will not be spoken aloud;
certain events will not be shown onstage” (71) so that the act of omission speaks to the Tristero

though in an ultimately unclear and frustrating manner. In the end, countercultural communities
seem so wary of external worlds (and perhaps even the threat of co-optation) that they employ
language which can only engage persons of their own kind. Countercultural language often
seems to allude to something only by professing that others cannot understand it such as the
bulletin, “If you know what this means...you know where to find out more” (121-122). Such
cryptic language ultimately seems to hinder subversive movements’ capacity for change since it
limits their effects to the small group of persons already prone to join such a community. The
only change they enact in those they encounter is a growing sense of resentment as illustrated by
Doc who finally launches into an uncharacteristic tirade: “somebody’s gonna have to be less
sensitive for a minute and wipe off their chin and stand up and deal with it, ‘cause I’m tired of
this being jacked around all the time, if there’s something you need just come on out and say it,
how hard can that be?” (270).
However, readers from a post-structuralist influence recognize better than Doc that
barriers to such explicit, clear communication reside not only in persons’ misgivings but in the
structures of language itself. Readers often feel especially disoriented as they encounter the
language within Pynchon’s works. Specifically, they seem especially aware of the distance
between signifiers and the referents they hope to express since this ambiguity prevents them
from arriving at any confident conclusions regarding the main plot of the mystery or the novel
itself. In fact, most of the pieces of data used earlier to develop a sensical description of the
mystery and the theme of co-optation rest upon tenuous claims. For example, Doc and readers
assert a connection between the Golden Fang and Chryskylodon mainly because he translates the
latter to mean “gold fang” (185). This translation involves a small though significant level of
doubt as the original translator--Tito--explains that “it’s squashed together a little, but it means
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like a gold [canine] tooth” (185). In fact, “gold” translates to “toχρυσό” (chrysó) in Greek while
“canine tooth” translates to “σκυλόδοντας” (skylódontas) so that Chryskylodon would amount to
a modification and amalgamation of these words rather than a literal conversion. This translation
loses only a few syllables; however, those syllables might amount to a fundamentally different
meaning. In fact, other parties (including Doc’s aunt) interpret Chryskylodon as a reference to an
Old Indian word for “serenity” (185) which adds an entirely different level of uncertainty.
This case seems to demonstrate the complications which necessarily surround any
transfer of meaning. Because different languages associate the same object or subject with
drastically different words, foreign languages emphasize how signifiers prove more connected to
the speaker’s internal nature and context than any external or constant referent. If signifiers
prove so disconnected from any concrete subject, then subtle (though pivotal) pieces of meaning
are lost in the process of transference. Many people admit that pieces of meaning are left behind
when language is transferred between languages, and the movement of words between parties
who speak the same language can encounter the same problems. Even if Tito’s translation
proved certain and completely reliable, Doc must provide a further interpretive move to link
Chryskylodon with the Golden Fang since the latter is referred to as just that--the “Golden
Fang;” not the “Golden Canine Tooth.” Ultimately, this ambiguity caused by the slightest
presence of interpretation entails significant consequences for the overall case. If readers
(including Doc) interpret Chryskylodon to signify the Golden Fang, then they can construct the
connections and interpretations laid out earlier. However, readers who interpret Chryskylodon to
signify “serenity” (185) or nothing at all might find these connections even more tenuous or
develop entirely different conclusions altogether.

Because interpretation so precedes and substantially shapes meaning, people from
different interpretive communities might only receive opposing worlds’ messages from a
distorting lens. The difference amounts to separate worldviews forced to engage and respond to
one another or two proverbial ships passing in the night. Terry Eagleton explains the dilemma
when he challenges Iser’s notion of reader response theory wherein the readers’ assumptions
used to interpret the text are “defamiliarized” and brought into greater consciousness by the text
which allows for self-criticism and transformation (68). As Eagleton explains, a reader with a
“strong ideological commitment is likely to be an inadequate one” (68) since he or she would
approach the text with a mind more closed to the “transformative power of literary works” (69).
Those who could find themselves influenced or altered by the language of another world would
have to “be flexible and open-minded, prepared to put [their] beliefs into question and allow
them to be transformed” in the “liberal humanist” tradition (69). Otherwise, the individual would
not even allow himself or herself the attempt to understand another community’s language.
Again, Nefastis supports this point as he claims the “sensitive” can only ignite motion in the
device through a dispassionately unprejudiced state of mind; he instructs, “Leave your mind
open, receptive to the Demon’s message” (Lot 49 106). But one could hardly expect persons
raised within an interpretive community that is formed in complete resistance to outside
perspectives--even pre-supplied with answers and tactics which ward against such voices--to
engage in the open-minded interaction necessary for such mutual transformation. Thus, a miracle
could only occur between members of this overarching, liberal community which might not
amount to as significant a change as direct engagement between radically opposed contexts.
Readers might corroborate this point by noting how Oedipa seems incapable of expelling
or suspending her contextual and perceptual influences to the degree necessary for adequate
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engagement with Nefastis’s device. The narrative voice mentions how Oedipa sat through “two
Yogi Bears, one Magilla Gorilla and a Peter Potamas” (106) while attempting such communion.
Readers might recall the literary convention of free indirect speech to suggest that such lines
actually refer to Oedipas’s--at least unconscious--thoughts and perceptions. The old television
cartoons subliminally present in the background thus amount to a metaphor for persons’
saturation within their interpretive communities. Media, daily encounters, and a multiplicity of
signals bombard persons constantly--though often without awareness or consent. These
influences then occupy people’s minds where they remain to disrupt, contaminate, and otherwise
prevent open engagement with those from different communities. Oedipa continues to try
desperately as she thinks, “I need you to show yourself” only to conclude, “But nothing
happened” (107). Readers might similarly note how Arrabal’s interaction with Inverarity might
actually have served to “reassure him” (120) of his present commitments. So long as the
judgments of interpretive communities reside unconsciously within our minds, communication
between legitimate others will prove contaminated. Interpretation precedes meaning, and that
interpretation is guided by interpretive communities, which only secures their lasting influence.
And this conclusion directly relates to the main question of this paper: the capacity for authors to
effectively transfer any meaning towards readers--especially readers from different interpretive
communities--and thus the capacity for authors to impact others through their writings.
To note the role that their own prior interpretive communities and presuppositions play
throughout their engagement with Pynchon’s text, one might look towards Oedipa’s pursuit of
the Tristero as a model. Indeed, one might propose a sort of analogy between Oedipa’s attempts
to develop the explanation of the Tristero out of the data she encounters and readers’ attempts to
develop a thematic explanation of the data they encounter in a text. As Oedipa struggles to

determine the extent of interpretations’ role in developing the Tristero, Fallopian offers some
advice: “Write down what you can’t deny. Your hard intelligence. But then write down what
you’ve only speculated, assumed. See what you’ve got” (168). Readers might adopt these
recommendations for their own interpretations of Pynchon’s works. They might form a list of all
the “hard intelligence,” meaning what the text clearly and indisputably shows, as well as a
separate list of every point that is potentially based on their own interpretive efforts. The list of
certainties might begin within the most basic point: Thomas Pynchon wrote a novel. But I might
include even this point on the interpretive side because its status as literary--composed of
messages and connections with broad meanings beyond a certain pragmatic context--is an
assumption. Readers arguably determined these texts as literary at the very beginning and
developed literary meaning as a result which amounts to reaching a conclusion before even
viewing the data 14. I next presume to know that Oedipa Maas is trapped by foundational systems.
But I then must acknowledge that “foundationalism” is never directly mentioned in the text. I
assume it explains Oedipa’s conventional and monotonous ways perhaps due to my interest in
post-foundationalism and my assumption that an author so directly associated with
postmodernism would harbor such an interest as well. At best, I know that Oedipa feels trapped
by something. I know that Pynchon mentions fantasies and imagination, but I already
acknowledged that one can interpret its use in the text as both a productive form of change and
another subtle version of a closed, monotonous system. I know that Pynchon mentions the notion
of a miracle as worlds colliding; however, one can interpret Pynchon to promote interaction as an
impetus for hybridity as well as to reject the notion as fruitless optimism. I know that Pynchon
provides references to shadowy forces of surveillance and co-optation, but he also contains
multiple references to paranoia (221). A main point of my interpretation is that overarching
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authorities’ convoluted relations to one another further prevent change in the post-foundational
sense that people cannot objectively explain such connections. But again, I know this stands as
an assumption based mainly on Doc’s conclusions which even he finally rejects as shoddy.
As readers further develop such a list, they recognize that the column of certainties is
filled with basic observations or elements devoid of any obvious purpose while the list of
interpretations is composed of these elements’ underlying spirit or intent. The column of
certainties contains the “so” while the column of readers’ interpretive points contains the “so
what.” However, the binary need not prove so essentialist in order to promote Fish’s extreme
version of reader response theory in which the reader is the primary constructor of meaning in a
text. The main revelation from the process of composing these lists may be not that all points of
deeper meaning necessarily derive from readers’ interpretive efforts but that each of these points
was potentially derived through some degree of interpretation. Readers might indeed encounter
textual cues and derive a meaning that aligns with some sort of authorial intention, and some
form of effective communication might occur. But readers cannot know for certain what pieces
of meaning derive from the author and which pieces of meaning derive from their own mind so
that--for all practical purposes--meaning resides in the reader. One might relate this point again
to Oedipa’s search for meaning as she concludes by deducing four possibilities. The Tristero
might actually exist in reality, or she might imagine its existence. The Tristero might amount to
an elaborate “plot” with Inverarity planting cues for her to follow, or she might imagine such a
plot (170). In the first set of options, Oedipa either views her world objectively, which uncovers
a greater truth, or she interprets her world which leads to a subjective explanation. However, the
second set of options might offer some correlation to the process of reading. Inverarity as the
architect of a plot might represent the author as an architect of the novel, for both Oedipa and the

reader follow a series of events devised by an outside figure. The first option amounts to an
Iserian notion of readers encountering and recognizing cues intentionally left by the author,
while the second option amounts to Fish’s view wherein readers construct these textual elements
themselves. Oedipa finds herself incapable of resolving this dilemma as “she can never again call
back any image of the dead man to dress up, pose, talk to and make answer” (178). Inverarity
thus represents the dead author who is only an absence and an interpretive construction. So long
as readers cannot determine which meanings result from the text or author and which meanings
result from themselves, one may view any conclusions with a degree of skepticism.
As shown throughout this process, a reader response criticism of Pynchon’s works--an
attempt to identify the presence of one’s own interpretation as well as imagine other readers’
possible interpretive moves--finally reveals a text in which meaning is constantly undermined. It
proves that any seemingly clear piece of the text used to construct an overall interpretation is
itself interpreted and thus challengeable. Different readers from different background conditions
will view those pieces of text in a myriad of different ways and thus reach different conclusions.
Even if we attempt to debate our different perspectives--even if we haggle over each detail and
challenge the different conditions or experiences which cause us to view them in such a way--we
will find that our understandings of those conditions are themselves based on assumptions which
are based on background conditions and so on and so forth so that the discourse seems endless
and irresolvable. Authors have no control over their works which entails that they hold no chance
to impact their readers, right? The “jig is up” sotospeak. The only attainable goal of writing can
be some sort of internal satisfaction, so all you writers might as well fire your literary agents and
store your writings in your bedroom cupboard. Well, not exactly. A less deterministic
interpretation of Fish’s reader response theory suggests not that readers construct every element
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of text’s meanings but rather that readers cannot determine which pieces of meaning might
actually derive from the author. Thus, authors need not conclude that readers necessarily
misinterpret every aspect of their text but that they can never control which elements of the text
are available for divergent, contrary opinions. An author perhaps can influence his or her readers;
however, an author cannot control or determine the nature of that influence.
To illustrate this notion further, one might point towards these texts’ open endings which
seem to frustrate readers as well as prompt them to acknowledge their own influence over the
text. Many readers--especially those trained in the English discipline--look towards a text’s
ending to better resolve perceived conflicts. However, Pynchon’s conclusions seem as
ambiguous on the theme of authors’ abilities to impact readers as any other portion of the novel.
The rather bleak interpretation offered before thus remains incomplete as different readers will
employ Pynchon to reach highly different conclusions regarding the capacity for different
communities to influence one another and stimulate change. As with all other themes, the
ideological leanings and general disposition of the reader ultimately determines his or her stance
on this issue. The reader reaches different conclusions depending upon whether they hold a more
optimistic or pessimistic outlook and, of course, depending upon what they consider satisfactory
or significant change.
The final scene of Inherent Vice in particular include hints of both hope and hopefulness
for the ability of separate parties to leave some sort of lasting change or influence upon one
another. Doc’s final situation seems bleak as he dejectedly forgoes all hopes to unravel any
aspect of the novel’s diffuse mystery and resorts to an aimless drive on the highway. An allencompassing and impenetrable fog penetrates his view, which could further symbolize this
post-foundational denial of the possibility to obtain clear or objective knowledge of a real world.

Doc finds himself in a “desert of perception” (368) which suggests he feels trapped within an
uncertainty that will likely never dissolve to reveal a definite pathway. Thus, his endeavors seem
as futile and unfruitful as the barren wasteland of a desert. In response to this revelation, he joins
a “caravan” (368) of cars which entails lining up behind the dominant flow of traffic where he
can “settle in” (368). Readers thus can interpret these lines to signify Doc’s final conformity
wherein he resides in a private sphere--no longer bothering to reach out towards those
surrounding him--with the ultimate effect of stasis. Under such an interpretation, Doc arguably
possessed a modernist outlook and ambition at the outset of the novel. Through his
investigations, he seeks to uncover a world of authenticity and greater truth (the world of the
Golden Fang) by interrogating the status quo or the surface appearance of his surroundings.
However, he concludes that such efforts eventually reach “some kind of limit” as uncertainty
seems built into the system15. If he can never find and steer society towards that authentic or true
state, then he seems too discouraged to try and influence society any longer.
Other readers might identify positive cases of mutual influence throughout these same
passages. The fog of postmodernism’s mass uncertainty encourages persons to relinquish their
previous, positive convictions which (as previously shown) have prevented them from engaging
in the more open-minded manner that allows for cataclysmic collision. Once the fog dominates
people’s perspective so that they can find no spot of clarity (no epistemological premise) upon
which to cling, the barriers between themselves and others seem less solid. The collective
uncertainty--or widespread “blindness” (368)--challenges people’s assurance in their principles
to the extent that they practically lose previous assurances in their firm, solid identities. It
encourages what Cahoone refers to as persons‘ ability to feel “‘objective’ about themselves” (5).

15

Notably, this seems highly similar to Oedipa Maas who seeks to find the authentic, buried reality of the
Tristero only to find such a certain discovery impossible.
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Previous distinctions between self and other thus seem less natural or obvious, which at least
allows for more interaction. Without the fog, the cars on this major California highway would
have continued on their own trajectories whilst generally unaware or uninterested in one another.
The fog encourages these complete strangers--these others--to gather and pay close attention to
one another. Furthermore, Doc supposes these cars might always “remember the night they set
up a temporary commune to help each other home through the fog” which alludes to the
moment’s lasting impact. Doc decides to drive clear through to Mexico where he imagines the
fog waiting for him “across a border where nobody could tell anymore in the fog who was
Mexican, who was Anglo, who was anybody” (369). As persons’ assurances in their beliefs and
in themselves--their abilities to say “I’m American, and these are my American values”--is
challenged, these worldviews can finally commingle enough to create something entirely
different. Doc’s final sentiment is hope in the possibility that the fog might then someday allow
“for something else this time, somehow, to be there instead” (369). Stanley Fish’s version of
post-foundationalism seems to simply acknowledge the dominance of foundational premises that
necessitate stasis. On the contrary, Pynchon allows readers to hope that an increased proliferation
of post-foundational thought can encourage previously divided sectors to finally allow
themselves to be influenced by one another so that the system is at least no longer a closed
system.
A text’s ending does not necessarily provide final, more transparent observations or uses
of languages; however, readers often assume as much. Thus, readers might interpret clarity and
closure where none objectively exits. They might appeal towards a novel’s ending to falsely
attribute their conclusions to some concrete, indisputable force such as the text or authorial
intent. However, Pynchon’s endings often feel incomplete or unsatisfying to readers. I nherent

Vice concludes with Doc driving aimlessly towards the great unknown in the hopes of eventually
finding something new, and readers cannot know for certain whether he finds it. Readers who
view their present zeitgeist unfavorably might first assume a pessimistic ending as persons have
largely failed to erect something entirely different. However, the text never clarifies that Doc
hopes to find that “something else” (369) by the twenty-first century. The text allows for a
general appeal that persons will accomplish change sometime in the course of human history so
that humanity’s experience as a species seems one massive open ending. Similarly, The Crying
of Lot 49‘ s Oedipa Maas realizes the presence of a mystery bidder possibly connected with the
Tristero which for a moment promises to clarify her own confusion as well the confusion of
readers. However, the novel ends with Oedipa sitting “to await the crying of lot 49” (183). An
open ending arguably prods readers to recognize that the text itself is irresolvable and thus
allows them to acknowledge their active interpretive involvement throughout the entire process
of reading and analyze the text through more of their own, personal insight. One might also
interpret open endings as an intriguing metaphor for authors who so concede their inability to
ensure that readers exactly follow intended cues to reach a clear, intended message. Open
endings seem a way for authors to accept that they cannot control how readers ultimately walk
away from the text.
If one adopts the second, more positive interpretation of Pynchon’s I nherent Vice, then
one might find the postmodern author uniquely capable of finding some means to influence
readers. A more optimistic interpretation of post-foundationalism suggests that while people are
presently embedded in epistemological frameworks that temper or suppress interaction, an
increasing awareness of uncertainty might lessen those barriers. Thus, a postmodern author
might achieve some sort of meaningful impact over readers and society by illustrating how
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principles deemed “natural” might actually originate from a challengeable authority. By hoping
only to express the difficulties surrounding meaning and expression, a reader response author can
use the uncertain nature of language to his or her advantage. Each interpretation of a literary
device seems to allow for a counter-interpretation; readers will interpret the characters’ roles in a
variety of ways; the mystery itself is disjointed and fractured; the text’s meaning is ambiguous.
As she ponders why Inverarity would go to the trouble of constructing such an elaborate hoax,
she recalls his advice to “Keep it bouncing...that’s all the secret, keep it bouncing” (178). Though
Oedipa fails to extract a clear message from Inverarity’s construction, she might at least escape
from those mundane tupperware parties. By embarking on the attempt to solve a mystery and by
constantly acknowledging the case’s multiple possibilities, she escapes from the strict formulas
of her previous life. Like Doc, her new awareness towards the plethora of perspectives and
explanations might someday allow her the open engagement that ignites something new.
Similarly, Pynchon might go to the trouble of constructing such elaborate texts with the hope to
“keep [us] bouncing” (178). He constructs labyrinths like the mysteries of the Tristero and the
Golden Fang not knowing exactly what turns of interpretation we might find, but hoping we can
end somewhere less definite.

C onclusion
The post-foundational reader response author stands to signify all people living with the
anxious feeling that an ideological, interpretive, or linguistic divide exists between them and
those with whom they would interact. The insights of postmodern theories and the works of
Thomas Pynchon need not merely augment these worries. Instead, they amount to a new goal
and a new means for communication. Often, an individual communicates with the intent to
transmit a particular message and induce a particular action. Like Congressman fighting in favor
or in opposition to healthcare reform, we begin with a sense of certainty and seek only to convert
others to that same belief. Like Michelle Bachman, we sell our certainty by attaching it to an
authority whether it be God, an author’s intent, or a transparent language. Through Thomas
Pynchon, one might find a form of communication which seeks connection with others yet which
begins with few other goals. Pynchon’s works mainly express the instabilities of communication
and the challenges to any positive meaning. But rather than forego the attempt to communicate
altogether, Pynchon continues to produce meaning while gladly inviting readers to construct
what they will. He reveal a communication in which one disseminates a message while accepting
that readers might clearly receive certain meanings yet will interpret others in ways which
seemed unimaginable. The goal of communication might be to foster and highlight the presence
of diverse interpretation; the process may be to develop a message that refuses to hide behind
pretenses of clarity and certainty. The final product is perhaps a message that weakens people’s
confidence in their ideologies and their words--confidence that serves as boundaries between
opposed groups. By limiting people’s confidence in the truth and coherence of their belief, we
might reduce the gridlock of Congress or other venues for public change and discussion. We
might “keep it bouncing” (178).
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Of course, Pynchon is hardly the only voice to confront the postmodern dilemma which
recognizes barriers to communication while also seeking to communicate. Even the early, more
radical postmodern voices express the desire to reach their readership and spur some form of
change. John Barth’s 1988 story “Night-Sea Journey” illustrates the strength of this impulse-contradictory as it may seem--through the narrator who begins the story by professing, "One way
or another, no matter which theory of our journey is correct, it's myself I address" (1) only to
conclude with the appeal, "Whoever echoes these reflections, be more courageous than their
author!" (4) The narrator begins by consciously refusing to attempt (or presume) to express
himself and his thoughts to a separate reader. He too recalls Roland Barthes who claimed the act
of writing is one of "inscription" or "performance" rather than "expression" (2). The author
cannot record his/her experiences or thoughts for future generations to decipher and one day
definitively determine. The author and his/her meaning cannot live eternally within the text so as
to find resurrection from continually renewing readerships. Instead, the author exists in the
moment as he/she places words onto a page and then disappears immediately afterwards. The
reader necessarily interprets and constructs the text according to his/her own contexts,
understandings, and experiences so that the text is constantly in the state of creation. Barth thus
seems to view the present tense as the novel's natural state as it reflects its continual state of
creation.
However, Barth's narrator concludes by desperately hoping a future reader will not only
identify his meaning but produce a specific, intended act. The short story which initially defies
both unitary, transferable meaning and ultimate purpose concludes with an appeal to be
understood and the promotion of a specific cause. The narrator might find himself influenced by
a desperate hope at the end of his journey, but this contradictory conclusion also aligns with his

dedication to paradox. This story rests upon an aporia, an irresolvable disjunction in logic, which
prevents readers from totalizing this story. They must simultaneously accept multiple
possibilities much as the narrator embodies contrary beliefs, expectations, and desires throughout
his life-long journey. Early postmodern authors like Barth often rely upon aporia and metafictional stories which serve as an analogy for the writer’s struggle in a postmodern world. An
interesting extension of this project might consider the influence of those stories in literary and
larger social spheres as well as the limitations. Do such stories necessarily result in the repetition
and stasis they seek to challenge or can they evolve to consider a variety of styles and themes?
Certain post-foundational authors from historically disadvantaged minority groups are
especially concerned with postmodernism’s ability to promote social change. Angela Carter
writes from a postmodern feminist perspective which seeks to liberate women from oppressive
gender roles by challenging the ubiquitous social images that portray such standards as natural.
Carter’s The Passion of New E ve specifically claims that “A critique of these symbols is a
critique of our lives” (6). Carter thus focuses on gender performativity--the notion that people
find themselves saturated with images of gender from the moment of consciousness which
subsequently act or perform. The images and performances prove so common and dominant that
the performance appears natural. The character of Tristessa serves as a powerful illustration of
this concept--a male actor who performs a woman so convincingly that he becomes the social
standard for femininity. As the narrator explains, “You had turned yourself into an object as
lucid as the object you made from glass; and this object was, itself, an idea. You were your own
portrait, tragic and self-contradictory. Tristessa had no function in this world except as an ideal
of himself; no ontological status, only an iconographic one” (129). Gender, and those who
perform gender, hold no place in being or in nature but rather exist as ideas perpetuated by
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repeated images or symbols. One might thus engage in a reader response analysis of Carter’s
works to see how one might uncover or challenge the specific images and narratives that
construct gender.
Salman Rushdie engages in a similar critique by uncovering the historical narratives that
naturalize a culture’s ethical systems. By challenging the privileged position of historical
narratives as objective truths, one might also challenge the standards and behaviors which they
tacitly or explicitly promote. Multiple characters within The Moor’s Last Sigh profess a moral
righteousness which is later challenged through either newly uncovered pieces of history or new
interpretations. One can even view the overall structure of The Moor's Last Sigh as Rushdie’s
attempt to construct such an alternative history for the whole of India. This novel inverts most
readers' assumptions as they expect a novel set amongst India’s major upheavals to center around
the major events and parties of that time and place. Of course, the dominant figures and groups
of a contemporary society tend to reflect back upon the past to decide what counts as most
important; they decide which pieces of history to foreground and which pieces to shove aside as
tangential anecdotes. In the case of Indian history since the turn of the century, the important
issues relate to conflict between the majority parties of Hindus and Moslems. But Rushdie drolly
admits that this story revolves around a family of “Christians, Portuguese, and Jews; Chinese
tiles promoting godless views; pushy ladies, skirts not saris” (87). Rushdie seems to focus upon
the most remote, idiosyncratic figures he can imagine--"the most eccentric of slices to extract
from all that life" (87)--which renders the traditionally emphasized events and divisions a mere
backdrop. Rushdie perhaps adopts such an approach to defamiliarize readers from their main
perceptions of this massive historical event. People raised amongst one of those major groups
involved in the partition and subsequent violence of India might struggle to view the conflict

with less of a bias. Their perspectives are so heavily influenced by the tales passed down from
their families (much like the narrator) that they cannot look upon these events or their
consequences with fresh eyes. By presenting well-known historical events through the allegory
of a family which seems unrelated at the surface level, Rushdie perhaps allows readers to
challenge their versions of history.
The simple act itself of constructing an alternative history might amount to a sufficient
enough challenge against those narratives and ethical systems which cause people real,
considerable damage. Granted, not all alternative histories prove inherently good. Nonetheless,
the simple ability and willingness to enter into a view of the past structured in ways outside one’s
dominant personal or social patterns could have a profound affect on ethical systems. Towards
the end of his confessional journey, the Moore asks, “How, when the past is gone, when all’s
exploded and in rags, may one apportion blame (418)? A new interpretation or construction of
history might allow one to recognize the fictive qualities of all historical narratives so that all of
history is reduced to “rags” and blame is no longer deemed determinable. In fact, the more
absurd or nonsensical the history the better since comparison reveals these narratives as no more
strange than the supposed truth. A toad-like man who knowingly instigates mass violence for the
birthplace of an avatar who later finds himself consumed in the explosions of his own making
hardly seems less likely than a fundamentalist Hindu leader who vehemently defends the
birthplace of an avatar to the point of mass unrest.
Additionally, these alternatives can offer people a means of escape when present
narratives no longer allow for human happiness or development. Vasco Miranda spent the final
years of his life existing in his personal history of loss. As the narrator notes, “Fourteen years is a
generation; or, enough time for a regeneration” so that “he could have cleansed his soul of
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poisons and grown new crops. But he had mired himself in what he left behind, marinated
himself in what had spurned him, and in his bile” (430). So long as fundamentalist communities
remain within similar narratives of binary opposition and unforgivable mistreatment, they will
exist in a negative feedback loop of deep despair and eventual destruction. While Narain points
only towards logical narratives based on actual geopolitical possibilities, powerful alternative
histories might exist within the merely different or even the fanciful. Histories of a young man in
his wife’s wedding dress, women in “skirts” rather than “saris” (87), a Jewish boy happening
upon a Moorish crown, cartoons, or a historical mural which includes a “half-women half-tiger”
and “sea-monsters” (59) might awaken people to additional possibilities of the past and thus
additional possibilities of present ethical action. An incredible piece of literary criticism might
involve reader response analysis from members of India’s Hindu and Moslem cultures. They
might explore how Rushdie’s novel interacts with the historical narratives in which they were
raised.
Each of these postmodern voices seems united in their ability to promote and foster
critique. They seek to challenge the barriers erected by past foundations of thought whether they
be barriers of gender, race, religion, or ideology. They seek not to offer didactic calls to specific
actions not to present clear, objective views of reality. Pynchon, Barth, Carter, and Rushdie seek
to simply express uncertainties and raise challenges which readers might interpret and employ in
a multiplicity of ways. Post-foundational critics and authors are still products of society unable to
consciously identify and challenge all of the foundations of their thought. They also reach
inherent boundaries as they seek to subvert such authorities or otherwise enact change. However,
they can all raise a general uncertainty which reduces one’s sense of a natural and definite self.
The true test of communication is thus not whether the recipient can rehearse a clear line of

meaning or even whether it changes their opinion on a specific issue. The true test is whether a
message can allow someone to see possibility where they once saw impossibility or whether it
can break into a closed system from any opening.
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Endnotes
1

Specifically, one would find this term within Wentzel Van Huyssteen’s E ssays in Postfoundationalist Theology

2

Like studies of fossils, Albert Einstein’s general theory of relativity, or Heisenberg’s “Uncertainty Principle”
(2115).
3

Lyotard also commonly refers to such comprehensive doctrines of thought as “metanarratives” or “supernarratives” (86).
4

Stephen of course would most likely never speak in such a seemingly clear manner, but for the sake of argument
we can pretend.
5

The author as “referent” in the words of Derrida

6

This imagery also proves strikingly familiar to Iser’s view of the text as a skeleton and the reader as the force
which provides the fleshy filling.
7

Present in the sense that they exist prior to interpretation which allows authors to employ them as constraints
against readers’ personal interpretations.

8

See p. 9

9

Another factor which complicates views of literary works as unified, harmonious products.

10

However, CNN aired a crowd shot of a Manhattan street in 1997 which allegedly included an unidentified
Pynchon (5).
11

Such as The Ramones’s “Two bar chord” (3) hit, Blitzrig Pop.

12

Or “surfadelic” (36)

13

Or at least the paranoia surrounding the possibility of omnipresent authority

14

Or counting one’s eggs before even knowing whether the bird is a chicken.

15

Notably, this seems highly similar to Oedipa Maas who seeks to find the authentic, buried reality of the Tristero
only to find such a certain discovery impossible.
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